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                                                               ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation includes three chapters examining various effects of the Medicaid expansion 
through the Affordable Care Act (ACA). I explore the topic of implementation and how it can 
lead to reformulation of policies, to other outcomes not expected, or even to outright failure.  I 
then apply the theory of implementation to three topics the Medicaid expansion is affecting.   
The first paper explorers how the enhanced matching rates affect the overall spending and cost-
sharing between the federal government and state government. Specifically, I explorer the 
behavior of state spending and how states allocate intergovernmental grants.  Previous research 
has shown that states respond to large increases in the federal Medicaid subsidy in a stimulative 
manner by increasing spending towards other programs. A logistic regression was performed to 
predict the Medicaid expansion’s impact on state spending on social welfare between the years 
2011, 2013, and 2015. Overall, the results are consistent with my hypothesis that expansion 
states use intergovernmental matching grants towards social welfare.  
The second paper explores the increased access of health insurance through the Medicaid 
Expansion.  A difference-in-difference regression (state-in state-out methodology) is utilized to 
observe the differences in outcomes.  I utilize a natural quasi-experimental approach to assess the 
impact of a large nationwide public health insurance expansion on access to health care services, 
health care utilization, and health outcomes between expansion states and non-expansion states. I 
found that Medicaid expansion’s impact on utilization was positive as blood pressure medication 
and cholesterol checks increased and a decrease decreased percentage of individuals in the state 
who needed to see a doctor in the last 12 months, but did not because of cost relative to non-





The Third paper explorers the Medicaid expansion’s effect on uncompensated care and Medicaid 
DSH payment.  Safety net hospitals are the last line of opportunity for the poor, uninsured, 
elderly, and disabled seeking healthcare. Safety net hospitals take an enormous amount of 
uncompensated care due to the lack of insurance. The Federal Government provides funding to 
hospitals to treat indignant populations through disproportionate funding programs, under which 
facilities are able to receive partial compensation through Medicaid DSH payment. The 
Affordable Care Act will reduce the amount of funding towards Medicaid DSH programs, and 
congressional action has delayed the cuts until the fiscal year 2018. I utilize a difference-in-
difference regression (state-in state-out methodology) and logistic regression to observe if there 
was a decrease in uncompensated care and DSH payments in expansion states and non-
expansion states (control). The results are mixed. There is a reduction in uncompensated care in 
expansion states versus non-expansion states, however, there is no statistical significance. There 
is statistical significance in the reduction of DSH payment in expansion states versus non-
expansion states. The results from the chapters give insight into the implementation status of the 
Medicaid expansion.   
The final chapter summarizes the findings from the three dissertation papers and makes several 
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                                                                  CHAPTER 1 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (PPACA or ACA) is the first 
comprehensive health reform law enacted in U.S. modern history. Its passage was historic and is 
the most notable legislation of President Barack Obama (Stolberg and Pear, 2010). Ever since 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, every administration until Obama’s failed to pass comprehensive 
healthcare reform (Starr, 2011). The massive legislation consists of 10 titles, with 487 separate 
subsections, with a major focus on expanding insurance coverage for United States (U.S) citizens 
(McDonough 2011).  The primary goal of the ACA is to increase access to affordable health 
insurance for the millions of Americans without coverage and to make health insurance more 
affordable for those already covered. In addition, the ACA makes many revisions in how 
healthcare is financed, organized, and delivered. The ACA restructures the private health 
insurance market, sets minimum standards for health coverages, creates mandates and provides 
the establishment for citizens to purchase private health insurance. Certain individuals and 
families will receive tax credits and federal subsidies to reduce the cost of purchasing health 
insurance. Some major provisions include the following: every U.S. Citizen must have individual 
health insurance or pay a penalty; children are allowed to stay on their parents’ plan until age 26, 
companies with over 50 full-time employees must provide employer health insurance; and 
insurance companies are prevented from denying coverage based on pre-existing conditions. The 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that by 2019, the ACA would reduce the number 
of non-elderly people who are uninsured by 32 million, thus increasing the proportion of legal 




Medicaid is expanded from 100% to incomes below 138% of the federal poverty level 
(FPL), small businesses and individuals with incomes between 100% statutory threshold is 133% 
FPL, but 5% of an individual’s income is disregarded, making 138% the practical threshold 
(KFF 2012). Additionally, 400% of the federal poverty level can receive subsidies to purchase 
private insurance through the health insurance exchange Market (HIX). President Obama and the 
Democratic Party managed and convinced some Republicans in Congress to vote for the 
Affordable Care Act. President Obama signed the ACA’s passage on March 23, 2010 and stated 
that “Health insurance reform becomes the law of the land in the United States of America” 
(White House, 2010). However, opponents of the ACA attempted to repeal the legislation after 
more than 50 congressional attempts at repeal, a 5-4 decision by the U.S. Supreme Court on a 
lawsuit signed by 26 states, and during President Obama’s re-election campaign in 2012. There 
were disagreements over whether to fund major parts of the law. As most parts of the ACA went 
into effect in January 2014, key parts of the law were still being arbitrated the courts, a majority 
of the states were not participating in the Medicaid expansion, and negative press coverage of the 
ACA’s implementation undermined President Obama’s agenda. The ACA’s implementation 
continues to be difficult. The legislation gives an enormous responsibility to the states, the 
legislation is highly politicized and left open to repeal even after President Obama leaves office, 
and billions of dollars are needed to fund the ACA’s provisions before it can go fully into effect. 
The issue of federalism plays a role as states are given enormous responsibility to implement 
major parts of the ACA (Weil, 2013). States play an important in role in expanding Medicaid, 
developing health insurance exchanges, reviewing health insurance premium increases, and 
enforcing new market regulations. It is not a unique situation as states have expertise 




at a time where state budgets have been at its lowest since World War II and budget shortages 
total 136 billion dollars (National Governors Association & National Association of State 
Budget, 2010).  Furthermore, managerial capacity, hiring freezes, mandatory furloughs and the 
addition of 24 newly elected governors complicate matters.  But even before states can begin the 
managerial task of undertaking how to implement the legislation, Congress had to vote on the 
many provisions on how this task would be executed. The division of responsibility between 
levels of government has been contentious, with states resisting flexibility in some cases and 
resenting perceived federal overreach in others. This is the essence of federalism, where power is 
vested between levels of government. Although the ACA is the law of the land, it is highly 
contested internally by its implementation complications, and externally by the opposition party, 
states, and lobbyists.  
 
1.2 HEALTHCARE REFORM BACKGROUND 
Medicaid reform is the first kind of such reform since its inception by President Lyndon 
Baines Johnson when Medicaid was enacted in 1965.  The first attempt to have healthcare reform 
was initiated by Franklin D. Roosevelt. He tried to attach healthcare reform in 1930 and tried to 
create a system of national health care insurance. At that time, the American Medical 
Association (AMA) told President Roosevelt to drop health reform from the bill or the AMA will 
defeat the entire Social Security Act. Roosevelt believed them and dropped the healthcare reform 
in his social security legislation. 
The American Medical Association (AMA) was able to raise tremendous amounts of 
money and hired lobbyists in Washington. In summary, lobbyist lobbied against the intervention 




people. (Hojnacki & Kimball, 1998)   
President Truman tried to pass comprehensive health reform, however, The AMA ran a 
candidate against him and Truman was defeated. President Kennedy had a bill called the New 
Frontier. This attempted to reform national healthcare, but it was defeated as well.  
President Johnson passed Medicare and Medicaid, which is the first major healthcare 
reform since President Roosevelt. President Johnson also passed Medicaid in 1965. It is an 
intergovernmental cost-sharing program that provides health insurance for the poor and disabled. 
The Federal Government shares approximately 40-50%, and the states approximately pay 20-
50% percent. This is known as the Federal Medical Assistance Program (Kaiser, 2012). The cost 
sharing depends on size, income, and number of low income individuals.   
President Clinton attempted to pass comprehensive healthcare during his administration. 
There were 11 proposals for healthcare reform from both Democrats and Republicans. The 
Health Security Act of 1993 and 10 other proposals were defeated. None of them passed. 
Because of the advocacy in 1993, the Republican Party had the majority of Congress in 1994. 
Lobbyists, AMA, private health insurance companies, and some freedom-of-choice type of 
lobbyists worked very hard to defeat President Clinton’s proposals, and they succeeded. 
Eventually, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) was 
passed in 1996, and it was the only successful part of the Clinton health reform.  
President George W. Bush in 2004 passed legislation with Medicare Part D, which was 
added coverage for prescription drugs. President Bush felt that prescription drugs were becoming 
an important part of the healthcare delivery system because it was underfinanced.  He passed a 




During the 2008 presidential election, many of the Democratic candidates proposed 
comprehensive reform of the United States Healthcare system.  After Barack Obama was 
elected, he proposed to congress a legislation called the Patient Protection Affordable Care Act 
(PPACA or ACA).  The rationale for introducing this legislation was to make healthcare more 
accessible, affordable, and cost efficient. A pertinent problem in the U.S. healthcare system is 
due to the imbedded inefficiencies of healthcare delivery and wasted dollars.  
The amount of money Americans spend on healthcare is 17-18% of the country’s Growth 
Domestic Product (GDP). For example, Switzerland pays about 10%, and most countries pay 
below 10% (WHO, 2010). The United States had nearly 24% of the population uninsured or 
underinsured. Most European nations have had some form of national insurance for their 
citizens. (Palmer, 1999). However, healthcare does not have these same entitlements in the 
United States. (Maruthappu M, et al., 2013), as opposed to other countries healthcare system 
where it is a privilege.  The United States healthcare outcomes do at best, if not worse, than other 
countries in the comparative amount that the United States spends on healthcare. 
The Democratic Party wanted to have a single-payer system in their healthcare reform 
legislation. However, the GOP opposed it and sought a compromise to the legislation.  It was 
signed in March of 2010 by Congress, which at that time was controlled by the Democratic 
Party, and signed into law without any Republican votes in the house and three Republicans in 
the Senate.  
Within months of signing the healthcare law, 26 lawsuits challenged the constitutionality 
of the Affordable Care Act. Different circuit courts and federal courts ruled different ways. State-




joined a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the Medicaid expansion and the individual 
mandate. 
In June 2012, the Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of the Affordable Care 
Act. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled 7-2 that the ACA’s Medicaid expansion is unconstitutionally 
coercive.  The Court also ruled 5-4 to keep the mandate, but as Congress’ power to tax rather 
than an issue affecting inter-state commerce. All 26 lawsuits opposed the individual mandate.  
Medicaid expansion is unconstitutionally coercive, and 5-4 gave states the option of 
implementing this key element of the law. 
In the final ruling, the Supreme Court viewed the individual mandate as a tax rather than 
a mandate. In its ruling, the court held that the law could not be upheld under the Commerce 
Clause, which was the government’s primary argument in its support. “The Federal Government 
does not have the power to order people to buy health insurance,” Roberts wrote for the majority 
(NFIB et al. v. Sebelius 2012). 
The initial assumption is that the law should have been repealed by that statement.  
However, the Supreme Court argued that the law could be considered a tax, and this is the 
argument the court proceeded with. Specifically, the court held that the individual mandate is not 
a “penalty,” as the health-care law identified it, but a tax, and therefore a constitutional 
application of Congress’s taxation power. 
In accepting the tax argument, the court relied on the “well-established” principle that “if 
a statute has two possible meanings, one of which violates the Constitution, courts should adopt 
the meaning that does not do so.” (NFIB et al. v. Sebelius 2012).   The court then noted the 




health insurance “makes going without insurance just another thing the Government taxes, like 
buying gasoline or earning income.” 
The historicity of healthcare reform gives context to the question for multiple reasons: 
1. It shows the checks and balances between the branches of governmental power in play 
2. It shows there are many actors involved with healthcare reform (i.e. Bipartisan 
congress, the agenda of the president, the role of the supreme courts, lobbyist, etc.) 
3.  Opposition is likely to follow suit when health policy reform is proposed/implemented  
4. Healthcare reform is accepted at higher rates among other countries which has an 
environment more conducive politically and economically. 
 
1.3 MEDICAID BACKGROUND  
On July 30, 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson signed Medicaid (a government 
healthcare entitlement program for categories of poor, seniors, and disabled) and Medicare (a 
government healthcare entitlement program for seniors through the Title XIX of the Social 
Security Act).  Funded by both states and the Federal Government, Medicaid provides medical 
assistance to those individuals who are considered to meet the terms of eligibility. Medicaid is 
funded by cost sharing between the Federal and State Government.  Although Medicaid was 
established to aid citizens who could not afford health insurance, it is the largest health coverage 
program in the country (Center of Medicaid and Medicare Services, 2016). In July 2017, nearly 
69 million people are insured through Medicaid (Center of Medicaid and Medicare Services, 
2017).  Medicaid covers numerous types of health services. Some of the mandatory services 
include: inpatient, outpatient, nursing home, physician services, and transportation. Some 




2016) Two-thirds of Medicaid expenditures support the health care and long-term care of the 
elderly and disabled, who make up 25% of Medicaid beneficiaries. Medicaid spending on 
children is only 20% of total Medicaid spending (Kaiser, 2016). The program is also the 
principal source of long-term care coverage for Americans (Kaiser, 2016). As the nation’s largest 
insurer, Medicaid provides significant financing for hospitals, physician and physician services, 
community health centers, nursing home facilities, and jobs in the health care sector. 
 
1.4 MEDICAID EXPANSION  
Figure 1.1: State Decisions for Expansion of Medicaid, as of October 1, 2013. 






The Implementation of the ACA relies heavily on cooperative federalism, but one aspect 
of the law was judged to violate federalism principles. During the same Supreme Court Ruling, 
The Justices encroached on the topic of federalism and the constitutionality of the ACA’s 
Medicaid Expansion Provision (Kaiser, 2012). 
The ACA was originally conditioned to continue federal Medicaid matching funds on 
each state’s expanding its Medicaid eligibility criteria. The change in criteria would have 
expanded Medicaid from a program providing health coverage only to certain categories of poor 
people to a program covering all persons with income below a certain threshold. According to 
the ACA, a state that chose not to expand coverage would lose all federal matching funds. 
Opponents of the ACA argued that when Congress induced the states to expand Medicaid 
eligibility by threatening the loss of all their federal Medicaid funding, it acted coercively, not 
cooperatively, thus exceeded its spending power authority. Pursuant to its constitutional 
spending power, the Federal Government cannot constitutionally compel a state to enact a 
particular policy, nor commandeer state employees to implement policies adopted by Congress.  
Opponents of the ACA argued that when Congress induced the states to expand Medicaid 
eligibility, by threatening the loss of all their federal Medicaid funding, it acted coercively, not 
cooperatively, and thus exceeded its spending power authority. A majority of the Supreme Court 
in NFIB vs Sibelius (2012) agreed. According to Chief Justice Roberts, the amount of federal 
funding that states stood to lose if they did not expand their Medicaid eligibility criteria was so 
large that the legislation left states with no alternative-instead the threatened loss of funding was 
like a “gun to the head” of the states. From this perspective, Congress was unconstitutionally 




conditional grant of federal funds. Once the court found that the ACA expansion of Medicaid 
represented an unconstitutional compulsion of state action, the courts decided that states would 
have a choice to expand. 
Undoubtedly, citizens from states who did not expand Medicaid lost expanded access to 
health insurance. States not expanding Medicaid have to deal with the issue of the “coverage 
gap.’’ Low-income adults earn too much to qualify for Medicaid under the current system, but 
do not make enough to qualify for tax credits in the health insurance exchange. 
In a democratic government, it is a slow process to pass legislation. Furthermore, it is 
very difficult to pass a legislation for comprehensive healthcare reform due to the bipartisan 
nature of congress (Edwards, et., al 1997). Also, the Supreme courts enacted a “new” policy for 
the Medicaid provision as well.  Thus, the accessibility of Medicaid was partially successful due 
to the courts intervention setting new provision of policy of the original legislative intent.  
The question of Affordable Care Act through the Medicaid expansion as cost effective 
has been prosed by many health policy experts. Seven years have passed since the ACA was 
enacted.  Research can be observed of the expansion if the ACA is affordable and fiscally sound. 
From a consumer perspective, gaining access to insurance proves to be beneficial. States that 
have expanded show evidence that health insurance rates have decreased. (Kaiser, 2016)  
Although this is beneficial to the consumer, is it cost effective to enroll uninsured people into the 
Medicaid expanded program?  
          President Obama claimed that the Affordable Care Act was going to be revenue neutral.    
However, recent data has supported the opposite. Historically, Medicaid’s performance in care 
delivery is substandard, though patients enrolled in Medicaid often have no alternatives and have 




the health insurance exchanges, there has been a decrease from the original CBO estimates set in 
previous years.  There were only 9.5 million enrolled in the exchanges rather than the original 
estimate of 11 million.  Also, the proponents for the ACA projected far more enrollees in ACA 
exchanges than materialized.   
From the health insurance exchanges, there has been a decrease from the original CBO 
estimates set in previous years.  There were only 9.5 million enrolled in the exchanges rather 
than the original estimate of 11 million.  Also, the proponents for the ACA projected far more 
enrollees in ACA exchanges than materialized. A new government report (Department of Health 
and Human Services, 2016) reveals  
Medicaid enrollees who gained coverage through the ACA cost almost 50% more, on average, 
than the government projected just one year ago.  According to the Human Health Services 
Department (HHS), taxpayers spent an average of $6,366 on Medicaid expansion enrollees in 
2015. That's 49% more than the $4,281 amount that HHS projected in last year's report. With 9 
million Medicaid expansion enrollees in 2015, this amounts to a $19 billion dollar blunder and a 
substantial additional burden on federal taxpayers. Also a study from economists from Harvard, 
Dartmouth, and MIT (Finklestein et al, 2015) found Medicaid enrollees obtain only 20 to 40 
cents of value for each dollar that the government spends on their behalf.  
         From the mandate and economics, when the states were negotiating contracts with 
Medicaid managed care contracts, the states were under the assumption that Washington (federal 
tax payer dollars) was providing 100% of the funds. The expansion population rate is much 




States have set high repayment models for the negotiated contracts with Medicaid 
managed care contractors. This has sent states to spend over 100 billion dollars in the first two 
years of the Medicaid expansion.  
Federal taxpayers are left with paying both enrollment in the ACA Medicaid Expansion 
and spending per expansion enrollee. The cost of Medicaid is rising in expansion states. This is 
causing budget anxieties and political misgivings due to the surge of enrollment and surge of 
costs associated with it.  There are gaps in literature that address the enhanced matching rates 
and the effects on state spending, economic productivity, and social welfare.  
The theory behind the Affordable Care Act is that by mandating everyone to purchase 
health insurance, the risk is spread out so that the “young and invincible” cover the elderly. 
However, the Affordable Care Act has raised insurance for young and healthy people, and many 
of them make the decision to pay the mandate penalty (i.e., taxation of 1 percent family income 
or payment of the yearly fee). Moreover, the law requires insurers not to charge more for sicker 
individuals than healthy individuals. This created a huge incentive to purchase health insurance 
when they get sick. Thirdly, there has been a subsidy program where there has been artificially 
low premiums (predictions) and now have to reflect the full cost of enrollees.   There are studies 
which would indicate the Medicaid expansion is favorable; however, it is too early to make a 
concrete assessment. 
One predicted effect of the ACA is that there will be a significant increase in the demand 
for healthcare services in those areas where states expanded Medicaid coverage to more people. 
The demand for healthcare has been a touted issue as our healthcare system is encountering an 
increasing aging population, expanded coverage towards the uninsured, and accessibility/quality 




meet the demands of primary health care services. Studies from states and countries have shown 
that patients who use primary care services not only save costs (Intention of the ACA), but also 
show better health outcomes as well (Health Affairs, 2012). Health outcomes can be ambiguous 
and complex (Health Affairs, 2012). For example, many health outcomes are made by patient’s 
decisions in terms of nutrition, physical, insurability, etc.; however, I believe tangible results can 
be achieved.  
Historically, for health insurance studies, there have only been two randomized control 
studies ever conducted. Although cohort and case control studies are useful, the biases, time, 
costs associated, etc. with them may not be able to produce accurate results. There is a limitation 
due to the difficulty in achieving a randomized control study in community health/social policy 
research, so I believe the conditions from the Affordable Care Act would warrant this 
methodology possible. The two previous randomized control studies (i.e., Gold Standard) will 
help form my argument for conducting the impact of the Affordable Care Act upon the Medicaid 
population and the beneficiaries/hospitals who serve them. 
  
1.5 PRESENT ISSUES 
There are gaps in the literature concerning the likely effects of voluntary insurance if the 
Supreme Court ruled against the requirement of health insurance and the Medicaid expansion 
provision.  Since this is the first time that health care reform has passed in the history of the 
United States, there has never been a repeal of legislation of this magnitude.  The ACAs 
provisions requiring guaranteed issue of coverage and banning the application of pre-existing 
condition exclusions depend on the individual mandate. Were the Court to strike only the 




explained to a lower court, “inexorably drive [the health insurance] market into extinction” (King 
v. Burwell, 2015) by allowing individuals to delay obtaining health insurance until they are 
actually sick. The theory is this: by having an individual mandate that everyone must obtain 
health insurance, as of Jan 1 2014, or pay a penalty. By including everyone in the insurance pool 
through age 25-65, the young and healthy will balance the elderly who pay more of the demand 
of the healthcare system. With everyone paying a premium, this will create enough money. It 
will create enough financing and balancing for everyone. 
Before the ACA passed, the State of New York had guaranteed issue and community 
rating but no subsides or mandates.  They had the conditions on what would have been the 
results of revoked subsidies.  In 2014, after the ACA was in full effect, the average monthly 
premium for individual insurance in New York was just over $500. In 2013, the average 
premium was almost $1400.  
Without the mandate, the health insurance exchanges established under the ACA will 
suffer from “adverse selection,” which is that only the sick will sign up for health insurance and 
this would lead to higher per member healthcare costs and eventually higher premiums. A study 
by Rand showed the effects of a mandate-less insurance program. The results of the study were 
that 12.5 million people who would have otherwise signed up for coverage will be uninsured, so 
premium prices would increase, and government spending per enrollee would sharply increase. 
They showed that the government would spend nearly double for every newly insured individual 
from $3,659 to $7468, and total government spending would increase from 394 billion to 404 
billion (Adamson, 2012). 
Moreover, the cost of Medicaid is 500 billion dollars and is projected to increase upwards 




better health outcomes and exacerbates the previous issue of the high cost of healthcare.  The 
Department of Health and Human Services reported  that 56% of Medicaid primary-care doctors 
and 43% of specialists were unavailable to new patients (Levinson, 2014). Furthermore, 
Medicaid enrollees who manage to see a doctor typically experience outcomes worse than those 
under private insurance, receive lower reimbursement rates, and become more dependent on 
Federal Government aid.   
 
1.6 STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
The purpose of this dissertation is conduct an empirical study on the effects of the 
Medicaid expansion. Furthermore, this study is designed to examine the effects of the Medicaid 
expansion and its relation to non-expansion states. Chapter 2 looks at the cost sharing between 
the federal and state governments through the Federal Medical Assistance Percentage. 
Furthermore, what effect does the Medicaid expansion have on state spending and social 
welfare? Chapter 3 looks at the effects of the Medicaid expansion on health outcomes, healthcare 
utilization and access to healthcare. Chapter 4 looks at the effects of Medicaid expansion and the 
relationship between safety net hospitals, non-safety net hospitals, and uncompensated care.  
In my dissertation, I seek to understand the effects of the Medicaid expansion through federal 
level and state level policy and how those factors influence health, social, and fiscal outcomes. 
Medicaid is not only important for its recipients, but plays an important role with policymakers, 
healthcare institutions, and constituents of the state. Health policy is meant to achieve specific 
healthcare goals within a society. The Medicaid expansion offers significant access to healthcare 
coverage to states that expanded. The decisions by policymakers have real implications for 




impact (positive or negative) of a health policy and how it effects the general welfare of society.  
Furthermore, the implications of this dissertation are important and provide insight for better 
policies and for improving coverage for people in this country. The dissertation is comprised of 
three stand-alone chapters, but these are each related to apply empirical evidence to key issues 
related to the Medicaid expansion. Each chapter seeks to answer the same question: How does 
the implementation of the Medicaid expansion affect key actors and institutions? These results 
are important for federal and state policy officials for the assessment of the Medicaid expansion 
and its effects on constituents. 
 
1.7 STUDY DESIGN 
It was difficult to determine which states belonged in the treatment and control group. 
The Medicaid Expansion was to officially start January 1, 2014; however, states expanded earlier 
using the Medicaid 1115 waiver. The Medicaid 1115 waiver allowed expansion states to 
experiment and modify their Medicaid program, which includes expanding early.  The Medicaid 
1115 waiver exhibits policies different from the regular Medicaid expansion, such as the criteria, 
amount, and duration that recipients are admitted into the Medicaid program. States that chose to 
expand through the Medicaid 1115 waiver could have been chosen in the treatment or control 
group, depending on their timing. States that expanded before 2014 could have been included in 
the treatment group, and States that expanded after 2014 could have been in the control group. 
For example, Michigan (4/1/2014), New Hampshire (8/15/2014), Pennsylvania (1/1/2015), 
Indiana (2/1/2015), Alaska (9/1/2015), Montana (1/1/2016), Louisiana (7/1/2016) expanded after 
the regular sign up period. Ultimately, I chose to exclude these states to restrict for confounding 




decisive factor to control for confounding and to protect the validity of the study. I excluded 
states that implemented the Medicaid expansion before and after January 1st, 2014. To keep with 
the consistency of my analysis, although the District Colombia does not have statehood, it is 
recognized as a state for the purposes of the Medicaid (The Public Health Service Act of 1944, 
2009).  
The states excluded are: Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Colombia, 
Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, and Washington.  The states that expanded before 2014 are California, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Washington. The states that expanded after 2014 are 
Pennsylvania and Louisiana. The states that adjusted their Medicaid programs are Arkansas, 
Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Montana, and New Hampshire. 
 
1.8 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
With the increase in access of health insurance of the Medicaid expansion, what affect 
does this have on expansion states versus non-expansion states? 
1. Chapter 2: With the increase cost sharing (Federal Medical Assistance Percentage) to 
states, how does that affect state spending, economic and the social welfare the state? 
a. Do enhanced FMAP rates increase state spending? 
b. Does the state benefit from increased economic activity? 
c. Does social welfare improve in the state? 
d. Will the Medicaid expansion be fiscally beneficial to the state? 
 2. Chapter 3: Does the Medicaid expansion increase health outcomes, healthcare 




            3. Chapter 4: Is there a difference between uncompensated care among the states that did 
implement the Medicaid expansion compared to those that did not? 
 
1.9 HYPOTHESIS 
            1. There is a direct relationship between the Medicaid expansion and state spending, 
social welfare, and economic activity. States with enhanced FMAPS will see an increase in state 
spending, improved social welfare, and economic growth. 
2. There is a direct relationship between the Medicaid expansion and health outcomes, 
utilization of Healthcare, and access to healthcare. Individuals in expansion states will see an 
increase in health outcomes, utilization of healthcare, and access to healthcare.  
3. There is a direct relationship between the Medicaid expansion and uncompensated care. 
Hospitals in expansion states have a significant reduction in the provision of uncompensated care 
relative to hospitals in non-expansion states. 
 
1.10 LITERATURE REVIEW 
The decision-making process in public health practice, formulation of health policies is 
complex and depends on a variety of scientific, economic, social, and political forces (Bronson, 
2009). Governmental policy systems vary widely in their structure and scope. Whether at a local, 
state, or federal level, the purpose of a representative body is to enact rules, laws, or ordinances 
that are in turn implemented by executive or administrative agents. 
The implementation process combines both an analytical and practical lens attend 
through a multi actor, usually multi organizational, settings rather than merely through a sole, 




spaces; for complicated, often-crosscutting public problems; and in political systems where 
power and often authority are shared among several units. 
        Implementation problems stem from the interaction of a policy at the local level. Federal 
policy makers only indirectly influence policy at the state level.  Therefore, there is wide 
variation in how the same national policy is implemented at the state level. There are certain 
contextual factors that may inhibit the success of a policy. (Matland, 1995) 
            Usually, implementation problems are affiliated with multiple actors and rarely involves 
only one actor (Brynard, 2005). Not only does policy implementation involve multiple actors, 
but it also involves multiple levels. For example, the Medicaid expansion operates at the 
national, state, and local levels; Medicaid is a joint federal-state program. Each state operates its 
own Medicaid system, but this system must conform to federal guidelines in order for the state to 
receive matching funds and grants.  It is a means-tested program that is jointly funded by the 
states and Federal Government; however, it is managed by the states. 
The number of levels would be even greater once we include intra-organizational levels (e.g., 
within the field agency). The organization of all the various levels at which implementation 
happens is not essential, but it may occur at multiple levels simultaneously, and the transfer of 
policy from one level to the other is neither efficient nor unidirectional. 
 
1.11 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983) define implementations as "The carrying out of a basic policy 
decision, usually incorporated as a statute but which can also take the form of important 
executive orders or court decisions."(Pg. 20) “The starting point is the authoritative decision; as 




effects” (Matland, 1995, p. 146). Mazmanian and Sabatier (1989) present three factors 
(tractability of the problem, ability of statute to structure implementation and non-statutory 
variables affecting implementation), which would determine successful implementation 
(Matland, 1995) 
 Advocacy coalitions are groups of policy advocates differing organizations, both public 
and private, who share the same set of beliefs and goals. These groups attempt to have their 
views of policy problems, solutions, and legitimate actors accepted.  
Barriers are found in the initial stages of the policy-making process, and to understand 
policy implementation, these processes must be studied; a careful policy-formation process gives 
important clues about intensity of demands, size, stability, and degree of consensus among actors 
pushing for change (Pressman and Wildvisky, 1979). An analysis that takes policy as given and 
does not consider its past history might miss vital connections. By concentrating on the statutory 
language, top-downers may fail to consider broader public objectives passing coalition. 
The top-down perspective is seen as a purely administrative process and ignores the 
political aspect.  It is, however, almost impossible to separate politics from administration. 
Attempts to isolate an inherently political problem from politics do not necessarily lead to 
political actions. They instead may lead directly to policy failure (Wildvesky and Pressman, 
1973).  
The bottom-up model argues that the interactions of the actors involved in 
implementation process on the local level must be understood in order to understand 
implementation (Matland, 1995) Policy at that level directly affects people. The influence of 
policy on the action of street-level bureaucrats must be evaluated in order to predict that policy's 




individuals in the local implementation level who can adapt policy to local conditions; it depends 
only to a limited degree on central activities (Lipsiky, 1980). 
While the top-down model has a strong influence to present prescriptive advice, the 
bottom-up model has placed more emphasis on describing what factors have caused difficulty in 
reaching stated goals. The political system in which we live can prohibit the bottom-up process 
being implemented. Policy control is directed in the elected officials from voters. 
Decentralization should occur within a context of central control. Healthcare providers do have 
discretion with their clients.  
The bottom-up model has differences in actions can be explained largely by local level 
variations, yet all activities may fall within a restricted variability where the borders are set by 
centrally determined policy. While central actors do not act in detail or intervene in explicit 
cases, they can structure the goals and strategies of those participants who are active. The 
institutional structure, the available resources, and the access to an implementing arena may be 
determined centrally and can substantially affect policy outcomes (Bardach, 1977). Combining 
the two perspectives and models, policy needs to be analyzed in sequences of more than ten 
years (Sabitier & Mazmanian, 1981).  
Rogers presents a communications model of inter-governmental policy implementation 
that sees state implementers at the nexus of a series of communication channels. They describe 
three clusters of variables that affect state implementation: inducements and constraints from the 
top (the federal level), inducements and constraints from the bottom (state and local levels), and 








Rogers articulated categories of diffusion research based around the aspect of the 
innovation process that was the focus of study. Eight categories of research were identified: 
Earliness of knowing about the innovations, Rate of adoption of different innovations, 
Innovativeness, Opinion Leadership, Diffusion Networks, Rate of Adoptions in different social 
networks, Communication Channels, and Consequences of Innovation.  
         The process of diffusion contains four key elements: an innovation; channels of 
communication to spread knowledge of the innovation; time during which diffusion takes place; 
and a social system of potential adopters in which this occurs (Rogers, 1995). Within this model, 
the process of adoption is said to pass through the following five stages: 
1. Knowledge – the individual is exposed to the innovation’s existence and gains some 
understanding of how it functions. 
2. Persuasion – the individual forms a favorable or unfavorable attitude toward the 
innovation. This may involve, for example, a matching of the innovation to a perceived problem 




3. Decision – the individual engages in activities that lead to a choice to adopt or reject 
the innovation. This may include interaction with forces of support or opposition that influence 
the process. 
4. Implementation – the individual puts an innovation into use. 
5. Confirmation – the individual seeks reinforcement for an innovation- decision already 
made, but may reverse this decision if exposed to conflicting messages about the innovation 
(Rogers, 1995).  
The innovation is the Patient Protection Affordable Care Act through the Medicaid 
expansion.  In practice, innovation may stimulate huge appropriations, or it may have little 
monetary impact if the program is adopted but never funded (Gray, 1973). Consequently, it is 
important to study the process by which states adopt new ideas as well as the process by which 
they maintain the existing Medicaid program (if they choose to expand). 
 
1.12 CONFLICT/BARGAINING 
Conflict plays a central role in the implementation process. Bardach explains the usage of 
metaphor “games” as serious and high-stake.  He notes that the use of the “games” metaphor 
enables the thinking about implementation to “look at the players, the rules, of play the rules of 
fair play, the nature of communications among the players and the degrees of uncertainty 
surrounding the possible outcomes” (Bardach, 1977). 
He describes, often in telling detail, games of obstruction, misdirection, and delay that 
prevent implementation of intended policy. He also offers useful ideas for how to overcome such 
obstacles. Bardach has continued this line of inquiry, to good benefit, over the years since the 




The conflict of pressure and counter pressure would presumably not occur and could 
therefore not shape results. But minor disagreements between just a few actors can cause delays, 
as can simple standard operating procedures in bureaucracies. A cycle of delay, fear of ultimate 
failure or high costs, withdrawal of previous commitments, more delay, increased anxieties, and 
so forth can also cause implementation failure (Pressman and Wildvisky, 1973).  
Bureaucratic politics make conflicts of primary importance. When conflict exists, actions 
change and actors resort to bargaining mechanisms which begin to reach agreements and hold 
coalitions together (Bardach, 1977). Coercive methods of insuring compliance are used. Actions 
tend to be the outcome of a long bargaining process. The bargaining process does not lead to a 
settlement on goals, but rather focuses entirely on reaching a settlement on actions (means). 
Often, the process centers on no action because actors are unable to reach agreement. Policy 
conflict will exist when more than one group see a policy as directly applicable to interests and 
when the groups have conflicting views. These differences can arise concerning either the 
professed goals of a policy or the processes of implementation for a policy (Matland, 1995). For 
example, a doctor, lawyer, and economist may have different views on how to implement the 
Medicaid expansion. An array of different actors may increase the intensity of conflict and 
increase the stakes for each actor.  
Even more so, since we are living in an age of technology, problems may arise and 
implementation activities are concerned primarily with getting the technology in place and 
functioning. Implementation failure occurs because of technical problems. Problems occur 
because of misunderstanding poor coordination, insufficient resources, insufficient time to use 
the correct technology, or lack of an effective monitoring strategy to control and sanction deviant 




In Implementation, Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) calculated the probability of 
successful implementation as less than 50% when an order is followed with 90% accuracy after 
going through six hierarchical levels. If orders are comprehended with less than 90% accuracy, 
the probability of success will fall even faster. 
This fits with the concept of top-down models where there are clear goals stated, and the 
implementation process is then to process the mechanics and means to that goal. Resources are 
important in measuring success of a goal (Pressman and Wildvasky 1973)  
The Medicaid expansion program is clear on the goals and fits on the administrative 
portion. However, there are difficulties with this implementation. The Medicaid expansion 
program raised the federal poverty line to 138%. This change in policy required an increase in 
capacity; increased access for qualified adult citizens in the United States would need to be 
identified. Problems may arise where finding an agency with the expertise and capacity to 
process numerous cases within a timeframe (sufficient resources); and combining several 
different lists to develop one complete list of eligible recipients (coordination problems). 
Low ambiguity and high conflict are typical of political models of decision making 
(Bardach, 1978). Opinion leaders are mentioned in the Rogers literature and have great 
influence. These opinion leaders have power and implementation outcomes are decided by that. 
In some cases, one actor or a coalition of actors have sufficient power to force their will on other 
participants. In other cases, actors resort bargaining to reach an agreement. If a policy exhibits a 
high level of ambiguity and low level of conflict, results will depend largely on which actors are 




The outcomes depend heavily on their resources and actors present from the bottom-up 
perspective. Also, we must ask how much participation each participant has.  Where, when, and 
how are the decisions made?  
Also, the greater the implementer’s authority to require agent action, the more likely it is 
that agents will comply with the principal’s requests. Actors, however, are not often in a direct 
line relationship with the implementer, and coercive mechanisms fail to bring about compliance.  
Many actors have autonomy and can refuse to participate without having their own 
agenda threatened. Even where there is relatively strong authorization (such as federal grants to 
states and local entities), states and municipalities exhibit a surprising degree of independence. 
For example, with the Medicaid expansion, states can refuse to expand the program (non-
expansion states). Under these conditions, activities are directed toward reaching a negotiated 
agreement on actions. Agreement on goals is unnecessary, and agreement on actions is sufficient.  
The bottom-up argument – that policies are decided at the local-state levels – fails 
because it does not take account of the considerable forces and power that can be brought to bear 
upon an issue when it is unambiguously and explicitly formulated. While local authorities may 
disagree, sometimes vehemently, with the means that are used, the central authorities have 
sufficient power to force their plan on the other participants. Low ambiguity insures that 
monitoring of compliance is relatively easy; attempts at subversion are likely to be caught and 
swiftly punished. 
If a policy displays a high level of ambiguity and low level of conflict, outcomes will 
depend largely on which actors are active and most involved (Matland, 1995).  
Outcomes depend on their sources and actors present in the government. These are likely 




outcome is one that produces learning. Policies function in areas where there is inadequate 
knowledge on how to implement a program(s) or of how elements in the policy environment are 
causally connected. Evaluation and feedback are vital components of effective learning. The 
bottom-up description of the policy implementation process would be a good model describing 
conditions in this category (Lipsky, 1980). 
The decision to expand Medicaid can be complex. Medicaid is a public insurance 
program that provides health coverage to low-income families and individuals, including 
children, parents, pregnant women, seniors, and people with disabilities. Medicaid is funded 
jointly by the Federal Government and states. 
Medicaid is an “entitlement” program, which means that anyone who meets eligibility 
rules has a right to enroll in Medicaid coverage. It also means that states have guaranteed federal 
financial support for part of the cost of their Medicaid programs. 
Each state operates its own Medicaid program within federal guidelines. Because the 
federal guidelines are broad, states have a great deal of flexibility in designing and administering 
their programs. As a result, Medicaid eligibility and benefits can and often do vary widely from 
state to state. With the Supreme Court ruling in favor for states having the choice to expand 
Medicaid, some states have the choice to expand. Some states (Arkansas, Iowa, and Michigan) 
are using the Medicaid 1115 waivers to experiment with federal funding to push the uninsured 
into the private insurance exchanges. Regardless if the state chooses to expand, there will be 
more uninsured patients being insured through the mandate.  
There is literature that shows a program can succeed if the actors are in agreement. 
(Duilio & Dulio, 1994). Because the nature of the policy implementation is bipartisan, 




Democratic and Republican legislators were concerned about the growing welfare rolls enacted a 
work program, Wisconsin Works or W-21, to curtail welfare dependency. The program 
succeeded because legislators from both political parties worked together and reached consensus 
(Mead 2001).  As noted before, bureaucratic conflicts can complicate the process or even result 
in failure (Pressman and Wildvisky, 1973). 
 




The Advocacy Coalition Model is a public policy process between a coalitions of actors 




place within policy subsystems, where actors compete to have their agenda heard (Jenkins-Smith 
and Sabiter, 1994). 
The ACM argues that actors perceive the world and process information according to a 
variety of cognitive biases that provide guidance in complex situations. In the case of public 
policies, such guidance is provided by belief systems about how a given public problem is 
structured, and how it should be dealt with. Within these belief systems, the ACM identifies key 
categories where people engage in politics to translate their beliefs into action.  
The Advocacy Coalition Model presents a general overview of the framework. A policy 
subsystem defined by its territorial boundary, a substantive topic, and hundreds of policy 
participants from all levels of government, interest groups, research institutions (Weible and 
Sabatier, 2007).  The Medicaid policy, for example, is strongly affected by the nature of 
uninsured patients, by the budgetary constraints by each state, and by political boundaries. But 
there are also more dynamic factors, including changes in socio-economic conditions (e.g, public 
opinion) and in the systemic governing coalition, which provide some of the principal sources of 
major policy change. 
Within the subsystem, the ACM assumes that actors can be organized into a number of 
advocacy coalitions composed of people from various governmental and private organizations 
who share a set of normative and causal beliefs and who often act in concert. In the Affordable 
Care Act, for example, one can distinguish a coalition (composed of environmental and public 
health groups, most officials in federal and state CMS agencies, some legislators at all levels of 
government, and specific researchers and journalists) as distinct from another coalition 




America Medical Association, and their allies in legislatures, research enterprises, and the mass 
media.  
In competitive policy subsystems, policy disagreements between advocacy coalitions 
often escalate into intense political conflicts (Weible and Sabatier, 2007).    
The ACM also assumes individuals employ a variety of resources that enable them to 
develop strategies to influence policy through a variety of venues. External events prompt 
subsystem instability and the potential for rapid, major policy change. 
In general, core beliefs are very resistant to change. A coalition's policy core beliefs are 
somewhat less rigidly held (Jenkins-Smith and Sabiter, 1994). The policy goes from one stage to 
another and generate activity within specific stages.  
           Furthermore, “Policy evolution usually involves multiple, interacting cycles initiated by 
actors at different levels of government, as various formulations of problems and solutions are 
conceived, partially tested, and reformulated by a range of competing policy elites against a 
background of change in exogenous events and related policy issue areas” (Jenkins-Smith and 
Sabiter, 1994). 
I use federal and state data in each state. The means of measurement would be used to 
assess which persons were most likely to enroll during the expansion. I would compare them by 
the self-reported health status of persons, bad debt to cost, and those enrolled before expansion 
and those enrolled after the expansion.  
The independent variable of interest was the interaction between timing after Medicaid 
expansion and expansion state, which compared the differences in usage of utilization of the 





Since there are multiple variables being measures, I conduct different types of regression 
analysis to measure my data. I believe empirical studies using quasi-randomized evaluation are 
imperative in public policy. Although not perfect, such research can be valuable for answering 
questions about the costs and benefits of policies, especially answering the implications 
increased health utilization, fiscal policy, and hospital administration services policy.  
However, there are limitations of a randomized control trial. The ethics, time and cost 
considerations, and generalizing certain states to the whole country all contribute to the 
limitations.  Using both methodologies will give more of a holistic view of the interpretation of 
results from the research questions. 
 
1.13 SUMMARY 
The second chapter explores the provision of enhanced matching rates of the Federal 
Matching Percentage (FMAP).  The traditional Medicaid program is jointly funded by states and 
the Federal Government. The (FMAP) varies by state and is based on a formula in the law that 
relies on personal income in each state; states with lower per capita incomes on average receive a 
higher matching rate. Through the ACA, the new matching rate provides 100% federal financing 
for those made newly eligible for Medicaid. The federal match rate falls to 95% in 2017, 94%in 
2018, 93%in 2019, and then 90% in 2020 and beyond.  Previous research has shown that states 
respond to large increases in the federal Medicaid subsidy in a stimulative manner by increasing 
spending with state-raised revenue.  
The gap in literature is how growth in spending equates to improved social welfare. State 
politicians take advantage of the cost sharing by bringing as many healthcare programs under 




allocate dollars towards services other than Medicaid (Coughlin and Zuckerman 2002). 
Using a database of Medicaid expenditure data, I conduct a logistic regression of the enhanced 
FMAP to Social Welfare variables. The Medicaid expansion provides insight into state economy 
and budget, state spending behavior, and social welfare. 
The third chapter analyzes public health insurance expansion on healthcare access, health 
outcomes, and health utilization. Policy officials measure the success of healthcare legislation 
through objective measures. The measures indicate the health of the intended target population. 
The ACA mandated that by 2014 states enroll all uninsured individuals with incomes below 
133% of the federal poverty level (FPL) into their Medicaid programs. States that did not expand 
Medicaid program eligibility would lose all their federal Medicaid funding.  However, the 
Supreme Court ruled this provision unconstitutional and effectively made the expansion optional. 
Although the expansion is optional, the Federal Government incentivized state participation by 
agreeing to pay 100% of the costs of the expansion population from 2014 through 2016 and at 
least 90% of the costs thereafter. The impact of the expansion can provide insights for 
policymakers regarding the effects it has on population health.  
This chapter utilizes a quasi-experimental approach through a difference-in-difference 
regression to compare several measures of healthcare utilization and health outcomes between 
individuals in Medicaid expanded states and individuals in non-expansion states before and after 
the Medicaid expansion.   
The fourth chapter analyzes the effect that Medicaid expansion had on uncompensated 
care in hospitals and safety net hospitals. Safety net hospitals take an enormous amount of 
uncompensated care due to the lack of insurance. Specifically, uncompensated care is healthcare 




arises when people do not have insurance and cannot afford to pay the cost of care. 
(Healthcare.gov, 2017). The ACA intended to reduce uninsured citizens and address the 
imbedded inefficiencies in the United States healthcare system. Moreover, the Medicaid 
expansion intended to reduce uncompensated care costs through new Medicaid insured 
recipients. Safety net hospitals face problems with crowding, delays, cost containment, and 
patient safety (Holden, 2011). I utilize a difference-in-difference and logistic regression to see if 
the policy stated what it intended to do: increase access and reduce uncompensated care between 
expansion states versus non-expansion states.  The results indicate uncompensated care is 
significantly reduced in expansion states versus non-expansion states.   
Table 1.1 portrays themes and commonalities among the three chapters.  The themes 
illustrate the main point of each chapter and are used to guide readers of the issues pertinent in 
the study. The themes are not a comprehensive summary of the analysis, but a series of topics 












Table 1.1: Themes of Dissertation 








Health Disparities  X X X 
Fiscal Policy X  X 
Public Health  X  
Health Economics X  X 
Health 
Administration  
  X 

















                                                                  CHAPTER 2 
 
2.1 STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
The study in this chapter looks at the cost sharing between the federal and state governments 
through the Federal Medical Assistance Percentage. Specifically, I research how the enhanced 
matching rates, through the Medicaid Expansion, affects states allocation of federal funds 
through other programs.  
 
2.2 RESEARCH QUESTION 
 Does the Medicaid Expansion cause expansion states to allocate federal dollars towards social 
welfare? 
 
2.3 HOW IS MEDICAID FINANCED? 
The Medicaid program is a cost sharing program. Since it is jointly funded by the federal 
government and states, each share the burden of running the program. While optional to the 
states, the Federal Government provides a large incentive to participate in the Medicaid program. 
Participating in Medicaid is voluntary; however, all states have been enrolled since 1982 
(Buchanan et al 1991). 
The Federal Government provides broad guidelines for minimum coverage or benefits in 
which states must adhere to.  Medicaid is largely decentralized, and states have broad excursion 
on the benefits and coverage of their program. This includes: provider and payment rates, 




Government. If so desired, states have the discretion to add more specific coverage and benefits 
to their Medicaid program.  
Medicaid payments totaled to Medicaid spending grew 10% to $550 billion in 2015, 
which is 17% of all healthcare expenditures in the United States (CMS, 2016). Medicaid growth 
was driven by rising health care costs, but also by increased state spending. Between 1970 and 
2014, Medicaid spending increased from 0.5 percent of GDP to 2.9 percent (OACT, 2015) 
Medicaid accounts for a large portion of the state’s budget. Medicaid budget also differs from the 
state budget. In the fiscal year of 2014, Medicaid accounted for 25% of all state budgets, 
including funds from federal and state sources. State funding, without federal funds, is another 
way to look at state spending which is financed through state taxes and other means. State 
funding, without federal funds, is the only method for states to received federal match funding. 
By 2010, Medicaid expenditures were over 20% of total expenditures, which is a significant 
increase since its inception.   
States send the Federal Government an accounting of their expenditures, and this 
spending is the basis for determining the Federal Government’s payments to states. In this way, 
the Federal Government has a mechanism for assuring accountability (federal dollars must be 
spent on qualifying services for eligible beneficiaries), and states are assured that their federal 
payments will be based on real, rather than projected or estimated costs or pre-set allocations.  
States can increase their spending on state-sponsored government programs from using 
the federal reimbursement by passing at least half of the cost on tax payers outside of the state. 
Governors and state legislators have concerns about the growing state spending which crowds 




state, and it receives a greater amount of funding from federal funds than other programs 
(MACPAC, 2015). 
Many politicians testify States inappropriately manipulate                
     state spending to increase federal reimbursement from  
     Medicaid. Senator Ron Johnson testified to congress    
     remarking: States fraudulently use Federal Money to pay for  
     Medicaid. Johnson said: When you as a state, is making a    
     loan to a jurisdiction, and the entire purpose is to get  
     around paying your state match for Medicaid, I would call  
     it fraud. “And that is what happens. Where is the shared  
     responsibility when you do it that way?” (USA Today,2016) 
 
During a 2004 senate hearing many constituents testified to the misuse of federal dollars 
and lengths states would go to allocate them:  
              
The issue of intergovernmental transfers is something that 
needs to be addressed.  Some instances are legal. It appears 
in many instances they are abused, and in some  
instances some of what is being done may be illegal. 
Medicaid is a State-Federal partnership, and the 
partnership does not work when one of the partners tries to 
game the system, and it certainly appears that in some 
cases the system is being gamed. So I have a formal 




consent to put in, but I am  looking forward to the 
hearing, and I again want to thank the witnesses for being 
here today. Now, there are some circumstances where these 
intergovernmental transfers are completely legitimate ways 
of local governments contributing to the State and local 
match.  Every State has a different set-up for how they 
collect taxes, but there are other circumstances where they 
are being an abuse of the Medicaid system, and I think we 
may need to take action to stop it. I think also though 
that these tricks are only a symptom of a larger problem. 
Medicaid's whole financial structure is held together with 
baling wire and duct tape, and we need to look long term at 
how we change this structure. We should not be surprised 
that States play the game. We wrote the rules of the game, 
and the rules need to be changed so that the States win 
when the health of low income Americans, children, pregnant 
women, the adult disabled, and seniors improves.   The 
system is not set up to improve anybody's health. It is set 
up to pay claims, and that is a fundamental problem with 
the financial structure of Medicaid. This system only 
continues to function because every State has multiple 
waivers to do something outside of the rules of the 
program. Think about that. You need a waiver from the 




status.  We need to change the rules, and the time is 
coming to fundamentally change the program so that States do 
not need these waivers and we have sound financial footing 
for the Medicaid system (Allen, 2004). 
 
The Government Accountability Office has designated both Medicare and Medicaid as 
potentially at high risk for fraud (GAO, 2011).  The Center of Medicare and Medicaid estimates 
that the Federal Government alone made $22.5 billion in improper Medicaid payments in 2010 
(CBO, 2010). The Government Accountability Office found $137 billion in improper payments 
in 2015, an increase of $31 billion in just two years (Ohlemacher, 2015). The size of federal 
payment transfer is massive. The Congressional Research Service estimates that the Federal 
Government allocated nearly $2.1 trillion for mandatory expenditures for benefits programs in 
2014 (Stupak & Austin, 2015).  
Experts estimate that improper payments are even more prevalent in these programs. 
There have been estimates that improper payments account for 20% of spending in federal health 
care programs (Sparrow, 2009). 
 
2.4 ARE STATES EQUALLY FUNDED? 
The federal Medicaid subsidy takes the form of the federal government reimbursing a 
percentage of state Medicaid spending, which is officially called the Federal Medical Assistance 
Percentage (FMAP). FMAP is determined annually by using a predetermined formula (Phelps, 
2016).  The pre-determined formula uses a three-year average of the state’s per capita income 




of the state’s per capita income from the years 2008, 2007, and 2006. This would be set in the 
late in 2008. This gives states more than a year to adjust their Medicaid program to the states’ 
decisions about program generosity. (Enrollment eligibility rules, breadth of services covered, 
and provider reimbursement) They are based on both income and price effects (Phelps, 2016). 
States with more income usually have more benefits to their Medicaid programs, but also face 
higher prices for their Medicaid programs because the rules creating the FMAP cause the federal 
share to be lower (Schineder et al., 2002). Previous analyses of Medicaid state plan rules show 
that the income effect dominates the price effect in general, so states with higher PCI tend to 
have more generous enrollment rules and higher percentage of the population eligible for 
Medicaid (Granneman, 1980). Federal legislation sets the formula where FMAP cannot go below 
50% or higher than 83%.   
 
2.5 THEORY OF GRANTS 
The economic justification for Federal Grant in aids is for the widespread, increasing 
spillover of benefits from some of the most important states and local expenditures (Break, 
1967). Intergovernmental grants are funds delivered from one government to another. This is 
most common from a higher-level government in the federal system to a lower state or municipal 
level government (Wayne, 2009). 
Many recent programs in government spending have been carried out through a major 
increase in federal grants to states and local governments for new projects. If programs set by the 
Federal Government are eliminated, the responsibility will lie solely on states and localities to 
eventually raise their own taxes to fund these programs once the federal funds are gone. Some 




future (Jacobson and Wasserman, 1999). The Medicaid expansion is an example of this with the 
expectation that the states will fund their Medicaid program after the initial funding by the 
Federal Government. This chapter’s purpose is to empirically observe whether federal grants to 
states do cause subsequent state tax increases, which would then cause states to have a more 
generous Medicaid program. The primary purposes of intergovernmental grants are to balance 
the fiscal budget across jurisdictions, fiscal efficiency and efficacy across jurisdictions, and 
internalizing spillovers to other programs.  
Federal grants result in creating jobs, new programs, and increase economic activity in 
the state. However, when federal funding is discontinued, states either have to discontinue new 
state programs or raises taxes to continue services.  
The implications are important because if this is the case, then the recent federal fiscal 
stimulus should not only be predicted to cause a permanent upward in federal spending, but also 
a permanent increase in the size of state and local governments in the United States.  
The literature review reveals that work has been done on the effect of intergovernmental 
grants on total government size (Grossman 1989, 1990; Grossman and West 1994), and there is 
extensive literature examining how federal grants state or local spending (or taxes).  
In this chapter, I explain the federal Medicaid subsidy through the Medicaid Expansion 
and then estimate the impact of the FMAP on the number of state Medicaid beneficiaries, per 
capita Medicaid spending, and average beneficiary spending. In conjunction, I attempt to explain 
the variation between and within state Medicaid programs through economic, demographic, and 
political factors. The hypothesis is that a higher FMAP encourages a state to form a program of 
increased spending because an increased percentage of the program cost is paid by federal and 





2.6 HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF GRANTS 
Ever since social programs have been implemented, intergovernmental cooperation in the 
allocation of grants has been an instrumental feature.  In the fiscal year 2011, $607 billion in 
grants to state and local governments. Those funds accounted for 17% of federal outlays, 4 
percent of gross domestic product (GDP), and a quarter of spending by state and local 
governments that year (CBO, 2011). The amount of grant aid has increased within the 1980s, but 
the purchasing power has not subsequently increased. It was not until after the 1990s that the 
value of federal grants increased.  During the 1960s, the Johnson and Nixon administrations 
passed social programs which mainly constituted as healthcare, social & welfare, and urban 
development. This increased the importance on federal grant aids to state governments to help 
fund these programs (Wayne, 2009). 
 
2.7 PURPOSE OF TAXES 
Traditionally, there are four potential roles for Federal intergovernmental grants: service 
benefits or tax costs that crossing jurisdictions, specific redistribution of resources among 
regions or localities, substitute one tax structure for another, and macroeconomic stabilizing 
mechanism for state/local government presence.  For Medicaid, grants are used for explicitly for 
the redistribution of resources. Medicaid specially is a grant that is awarded based on statistical 
criteria for specific types of work. The sanctioning legislation and regulations define the 
algorithm of criteria and the amount of funds to be distributed. A formula grant refers to the way 




allocated for formula or project based grants and may be open-ended or closed-ended 
(Thompson, 1981). 
The Federal Government provides matching funds to reimburse state Medicaid 
expenditures. It is referred an opened matching grant. The Federal Government provides an 
open-ended matching formula to fund benefits which fall under state Medicaid programs. The 
purpose of matching grants are shared under the discretion of the Federal Government. They are 
contingent on states following several prescriptive federal rules in order to receive the funds 
(Kaiser, 2011). States send the Federal Government an accounting of their expenditures, and this 
spending is the basis for determining the Federal Government’s payments to states.  Typically, a 
specific matching aid program matches each dollar of the state/local government tax on the 
specific service with matching rate grant dollars. This is an example of a matching formula: 
E= X / (1+X)  
If X = 1, the total compensation the Federal Government will match at is 1/2 or .5. The 
formula has been set by legislation and regulations, and each state would have a different 
formula due to FMAP. Additionally, formula grants are generally for U.S. state, local, or 
territory governments rather than for private organizations; individuals do not directly receive 
formula grants. 
A formula to predict matching grants is the following: 
P=1 – M 






What the predicting match rate does is show how much the government tends to support 
local governments. The grant reduces the price of additional amounts aided services to local 
governments. If R=1, the government would pay one dollar for every half dollar the local 
government spends.  Medicaid functions as an open matching grant system.  All states have 
opted into the Medicaid program by choice, and the Federal Government provides the open 
matching grants which amount to $1-$3 from the Federal Government for each dollar the states 
spend. Federal funding is determined by the states per capita income (FMAP). States with a 
lower income per capita will receive more federal dollars.  The regular average State FMAP is 
57%, but ranges from 50% in wealthier states up to 75% in states with lower per capita income. 
The maximum FMAP is 83%. FMAPs are adjusted for each state on a three-year cycle to 















Figure 2.1: State Distribution of Regular FMAP Rates 
 
 
(Source: Department of Health and Human Services. "Federal Financial Participation in State 
Assistance Expenditures; Federal Matching Shares for Medicaid, the Children's Health Insurance 
Program, and Aid to Needy Aged, Blinde, or Disabled Persons for October 1, 2013 Through 
September 30, 2014, "77 Federal Register 71420, November 30, 2012.)  
 
Another alternative that matching grants provide is tax relief. As stated previously, 
matching grants can have a simulative effect when consumers spend on certain services; 
however, grant spending is larger.  Medicaid has a price inelastic effect, where a matching grant 
increases expenditures by less than the amount of the grant, thus freeing local funds to be spent 





2.8 MEDICAID COST SHARING 
         Higher-level government use intergovernmental grants for economic benefits. The theory 
behind matching grants is that it induces a price effect. A matching grant reduces a marginal cost 
(cost of services), which increases the demand for services provided.  In microeconomics, a price 
decrease has a greater effect than an increase in income.  The fundamental reason is because the 
price has dropped and the consumer index power has increased – as opposed to only an increase 
of consumer index power with an increased income. This incentivizes consumers to purchase 
services. The price effect has a double effect; it increases the consumer purchasing power index 
and lowers relative cost.  From the Federal Government’s perspective, it will increase their 
expenditure more than a closed match or lump sum grant. The government could choose to 
increase their expenditure, but it would mitigate the price incentive (Wayne, 2009). 
The FMAP, or federal reimbursement, averages historically about 57% of state Medicaid 
reimbursement (CMS, 2016). This creates an incentive for states to be more concerned about 
maximizing federal contributions and directing healthcare program under the umbrella of 
Medicaid to receive more federal dollars. The open-ended federal reimbursement of state 
Medicaid expenditures is the program’s key structural flaw. “Cartel federalism” is a term that 
refers to Medicaid’s design in which states compete for federal dollars to fund their state 
programs (Grieve, 2015). The relative size of the transfer is about half of all federal dollars 
transferred to the states and are channeled through the federal reimbursement of state Medicaid 
spending. The federal Medicaid reimbursement allows state politicians to increase state 






2.9 MEDICAID AND SOCIAL WELFARE 
          Medicaid is the provider of last resort for the poor and the sick and during economic 
Downturns, more people lose their employment-based health insurance protection and thus, more 
individuals and families become Medicaid eligible, ultimately relying on public health programs 
to obtain health care. Medicaid has a counter-cyclical relation between unemployment and the 
number of Medicaid Beneficiaries. The countercyclical government spending is linked to protect 
household income and promotes a stimulus in economic activity. (Sommers & Gruber, 2016) 
Often what’s not discussed is the multiplier effect of Medicaid. The multiplier effect has 
secondary effects related to household income, state tax revenue, and social welfare.   
          Although there is vast amounts of literature on the benefits of expanded Medicaid on 
healthcare, there is a gap in literature on the Medicaid expansion and its impact on the economy 
and social welfare. However, previous literature has found Medicaid spending generates 
economic activity, including jobs, income and state tax revenues (Moore School of Business 
South Carolina, 2002; Missouri Foundation for Health, 2005) and the decline of federal subsidies 
in Medicaid will lead to declines in state economic activity. (North Carolina Journal of Medicine, 
2008) 
           The purpose of this chapter is to empirically observe whether federal grants to states do 
cause subsequent state tax increases which would then cause states to have more a more 
spending through their Medicaid program. I specifically look at the secondary effects of the 







2.10 METHODS AND DATA 
           The effect of the Medicaid expansion and its effects on Medicaid State Spending through 
Cost Sharing can be depicted with the Logistic regression equation: 
 
        Yit(group) = 1 / (1 + exp(- intercept – coefficient(β) *spending increase(X)))(Eq.1) 
 
Yit is the binary response variable for Expansion States and non-expansion state in Time period 
year (t).  (β) is the regression coefficient. (X) is the explanatory variable which is social welfare 
spending. The dependent variable which measures the Expansion state is equal to 1 and states 
that did not expand their Medicaid program is equal to 0. I was able to obtain 2011-2015 State 
Panel Data from the Census Bureau and compared the years 2011, 2013, and 2015.   
           The advantage of using a logistic regression is that it is a predictor model. Rather than 
conducting a correlational study using a Chi2 or Fischer exact test, a logistic regression model 
can include more than one explanatory variable. Furthermore, a logistic regression, as opposed to 
a correlation test, mitigates for confounding variables. A logistic model would estimate or 
predict whether the Medicaid expansion had a significant influence on expansion states and non-
expansion states spending on social welfare. Moreover, I want to predict whether expansion 
states spend more on social welfare with their increased matching rate compared to non-
expansion states. The Census Bureau dataset is not an academic dataset that can easily be used 
for analysis.  Adjusting for confounding is not possible with the Census Bureau data set, since it 




methodology; however, additional testing is needed to confirm results and to mitigate threats of 
internal and external validity.  
 
2.11 RESULTS 
Table 2.1 is a descriptive summary table of variables between state spending and social welfare. 
The table summary shows the regression analysis output for different quantitative responses.  In 
particular, the confidence interval is a range around measurements that convey how precise that 
measurement is. Table 2.2 shows the raw data and grouping of state spending and social welfare. 
Table 2.3 examined three different logistic regression models comparing three different years. 
The analysis was significant in the Medicaid expansion comparison years and expansion states 
were found to be significant predictors of social welfare spending. Comparing the years 2011 
and 2015, the Medicaid expansion caused a significant increase in spending on social welfare 
among expansion states. (Mean 0.01, SD .09, Exp(β)=11.37**, 95% CI [0.19, 0.36]. Figure 2.2 
shows the logistic regression between the years 2011 and 2015. Comparing the years 2013 and 
2015, The Medicaid Expansion caused a significant increase in spending on social welfare 
among expansion states (Mean 0.21, SD .18, Exp β)=8.03*, 95% CI [0.12, 0.30]) Figure 2.3 
shows the logistic regression between the years 2013 and 2015. However, there was no statistical 
significance between the years 2011 and 2013 (Mean 0.28, SD .17, Exp(β)=.2.35, 95% CI [0.01, 
0.10].).  Figure 2.4 shows the logistic regression between the years 2011 and 2013.  
 
2.12 LIMITATIONS 
This study has limitations that could hinder the results. The disadvantage of a quasi-experimental 




likely to influence a state’s generosity towards social welfare. Political ideology, propensity to 
spend towards social welfare, and immigrant population are specific examples of confounding 
variables that could affect expansion states spending towards social welfare.  Although using a 
logistic regression minimizes the effects of confounding variables, it is impossible to control for 
every variable that could influence the results. Furthermore, the Census Bureau's data is limited 
towards the amount states spend on certain programs and does not have any variables to test for 
confounding variables listed above related to social welfare. The Census Bureau data only 
reports individual state spending with the respective program it spent on. Although the Census 
Bureau does provide data on some of the confounding variables, they are not standardized to the 
same metrics of the Census Bureau state financial spending data.  Normally, The Center of 
Medicaid and Medicare would provide data for Medicaid state spending and other variables to 
adjust for confounding. At the time of the analysis, Medicaid expansion data was publicly 
unavailable. Further research is needed to adjust for confounding variables to assess the true 
impact of the Medicaid expansion towards state spending on social welfare. Due to the limited 
availability of data, future research should be conducted to examine the full effects of spending 
as time passes.   
 
2.13 DISCUSSION 
The main purpose of Chapter 2 is to examine the relationship between increased federal 
subsidy through the Medicaid expansion and state spending behavior.  This chapter shows that 
federal matching grants can have profound impact on state behavior. In most specifications, a 
higher FMAP increases the generosity of state Medicaid programs, mostly by increasing the 




broad guidelines for minimum coverage or benefits in which states must adhere to.  Medicaid is 
largely decentralized and states have broad excursion on the benefits and coverage of their 
program. State Medicaid spending is largely financed by federal tax dollars. The Federal match 
gives states the incentive to use their Medicaid program with subsidized costs. In addition to the 
benefits are the costs associated with matching. States attempt to channel as many healthcare 
programs under Medicaid to qualify for federal funds. As governors mull the decision to expand 
Medicaid due to taking 25% of the state budget, states will lose up to 1 dollar to 3 dollars of 
federal funds for every dollar cut from their Medicaid program. Medicaid is the only program 
that provides federal funding and is the last program be cut because it is the only program that 
generates federal subsides.  
Research studies often measure the effect of health benefits associated with a public 
insurance expansion. However, the economic benefits and social welfare are often overlooked 
with the cost sharing of the Medicaid Program.  Since states bear limited costs in expansion, the 
impact toward a state’s decision may be beneficial as a result.  Since states will receive funding 
through the Federal Government with no tax associated with it, state spending may be altered in 
the alleviation of certain health services, state increase overall spending, State spending shifted 
towards other programs, and overall stimulus in the state economy. For example, citizens who 
had to pay for premiums for health insurance before the expansion can redirect their funds 
towards other personal needs such as food, gas, clothing, etc. Individuals can therefore spend 
money on personal needs due to the increase in social welfare benefits. This would in theory 
cause an increase in state spending and increase in state revenue through taxes. This chapter 
leaves unanswered an important question of whether the Medicaid expansion caused an increase 





          My results show a significant regression correlation for (2011 vs 2015) and (2013 vs 
2015), but no significant correlation between (2011 vs 2013), indicating that the expansion states 
have dramatically increased their spending on public welfare (compare to non-expansion states). 
Because there was statistically significant results for the expansion year (2015) and no statistical 
significance for the comparison of non-expansion years (2011 vs 2013), this shows a strong 
predictor that the Medicaid expansion caused an increase in spending on social welfare in 
expansion states and that it was not due to random chance. A limitation to the study was the 
analysis on other sectors of the census bureau data did not correlate and public welfare was the 
only sector that saw significant results. One can argue that all expansion states have generous 
social welfare programs and would expand their Medicaid program. However, there are political, 
economic, and demographic factors that would prohibit the decision to expand and not all 
expansion states have generous welfare programs.  For example, Illinois had a democratic 
controlled congress and governor that expanded Medicaid but does not have a generous welfare 
benefits program. (Tanner and Hughes, 2013) Furthermore, Arizona had a republican governor 
who expanded Medicaid and their state does not have a generous welfare program. (Tanner and 
Hughes, 2013) There are strong incentives for expansion states to use federal dollars for other 
programs.  
Since the 1980s, federal grants to states for most purposes shrank substantially, and Medicaid 
became the main method by which states could increase federal revenues. Historical and 
empirical evidences shows high Medicaid reimbursement rate incentivizes states to expand not 
only for Medicaid program eligibility, but vast economic benefits provided to the states through 




partisanship and opposition to the ACA, the extremely high federal matching rates would 
incentivizes all states to expand.  If the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid expansion is still intact, 
I predict all states will eventually expand their Medicaid program.  Although federal fund 
subsidies can increase the size of a state’s Medicaid program, it is a government program where 
waste and fraud can occur. An increase in a state’s Medicaid program may seem beneficial, but 
federal tax payers burden the cost of the expansion and may decrease the nation’s economic 
efficiency. This is a question worthy for further future research. State policymakers should 
consider these benefits, along with health and financial effects for enrollees, as they decide 
whether to initiate or continue further Medicaid expansion. My results show the expansion states 





































Median -0.5929 -0.723 -1.02 
Fischer score  5 4 4 
AIC 41.5 45.2 52.0 
Standard Error 4.52 3.7 4.36 
Minimum -1.45 -1.40 -1.25 
Maximum 1.96 1.74 1.42 
Z-Value 2.5 2.17 0.54 




Table 2.2: Results of Logistic Regression for Public Welfare 
 
State grp 2011 2013 2015 11vs13 13vs15 11vs15 
 IN  1 8,396,983 10,748,417 11,501,010 0.28 0.07002 0.37 
 NE  0 2,090,850 2,517,272 2,626,032 0.2 0.04321 0.26 
 CO    4,906,783 5,840,287 7,910,755 0.19 0.35451 0.61 
 CT    6,362,163 7,318,979 7,677,002 0.15 0.04892 0.21 
 OK  0 5,456,745 6,258,083 6,502,889 0.15 0.03912 0.19 
 AR    4,493,896 5,139,552 6,642,465 0.14 0.29242 0.48 
 NY  1 51,131,664 58,009,518 58,344,171 0.13 0.00577 0.14 
 LA    6,425,818 7,259,194 8,365,742 0.13 0.15243 0.3 
 NV    2,127,591 2,400,389 3,779,343 0.13 0.57447 0.78 
 DE  1 1,762,406 1,971,064 2,323,157 0.12 0.17863 0.32 
 NC  0 11,619,455 12,977,012 13,568,795 0.12 0.0456 0.17 
 VT  1 1,462,903 1,629,482 1,728,547 0.11 0.0608 0.18 
 GA  0 10,366,884 11,518,235 12,197,038 0.11 0.05893 0.18 
 IL    18,508,659 20,279,332 22,671,203 0.1 0.11795 0.22 
 OR  1 6,040,817 6,575,475 10,039,321 0.09 0.52678 0.66 
 AK  1 1,917,737 2,084,000 2,113,211 0.09 0.01402 0.1 
 MD  1 9,274,305 10,044,675 12,121,427 0.08 0.20675 0.31 
 IA    4,900,757 5,265,106 6,223,107 0.07 0.18195 0.27 
 UT  0 2,812,493 3,017,968 3,245,210 0.07 0.0753 0.15 
 WV  1 3,287,709 3,526,796 4,393,172 0.07 0.24566 0.34 
 AL  0 5,961,891 6,386,764 6,872,757 0.07 0.07609 0.15 
 MS    5,436,907 5,816,559 6,228,236 0.07 0.07078 0.15 
 WY  0 739,851 783,143 795,434 0.06 0.01569 0.08 




Table 2.2 (cont.) 
VA  0 9,347,936 9,855,058 11,248,106 0.05 0.14135 0.2 
 MO  0 7,586,724 7,988,161 8,399,342 0.05 0.05147 0.11 
 US    494,828,803 519,126,562 608,987,553 0.05 0.1731 0.23 
 MN    10,872,302 11,323,904 13,108,732 0.04 0.15762 0.21 
 OH  1 18,421,960 19,186,691 19,421,982 0.04 0.01226 0.05 
 NJ    14,213,978 14,701,447 18,197,283 0.03 0.23779 0.28 
 CA    77,456,692 80,014,405 109,031,702 0.03 0.36265 0.41 
 ND  1 913,375 943,371 1,335,551 0.03 0.41572 0.46 
 MT    1,390,134 1,421,146 1,545,178 0.02 0.08728 0.11 
 TN  0 10,746,576 10,959,849 11,420,314 0.02 0.04201 0.06 
 FL  0 22,302,600 22,528,115 25,913,158 0.01 0.15026 0.16 
 ID  0 2,174,866 2,190,795 2,304,073 0.01 0.05171 0.06 
 SD  0 965,643 971,649 1,037,395 0.01 0.06766 0.07 
 HI  1 2,086,752 2,098,924 2,480,019 0.01 0.18157 0.19 
 MI  0 14,926,663 14,985,940 18,410,125 0 0.22849 0.23 
 RI  1 2,403,320 2,394,541 2,672,489 0 0.11608 0.11 
 ME  0 2,905,192 2,892,491 2,917,467 0 0.00863 0 
 WI  0 8,969,198 8,849,077 10,227,923 -0.01 0.15582 0.14 
 TX  0 31,269,267 30,780,705 35,961,689 -0.02 0.16832 0.15 
 PA    23,707,455 23,078,652 24,749,412 -0.03 0.07239 0.04 
 WA    8,668,902 8,389,040 11,477,978 -0.03 0.36821 0.32 
 KY  1 7,334,231 7,083,731 10,918,824 -0.03 0.54139 0.49 





Table 2.2 (cont.) 
NM  1 4,329,057 3,946,347 5,610,951 -0.09 0.42181 0.3 
SC  0 6,648,186 6,050,877 7,398,432 -0.09 0.2227 0.11 
AZ  1 9,511,299 8,494,905 10,440,648 -0.11 0.22905 0.1 





Table 2.3: Summary of Logistic Regression Analysis 
Table 2.3:  Summary of Logistic Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting 
Social Welfare spending between Expansion States versus Non-expansion 
States      p<.01**  p<.05* 
Logistic regression  11vs13 11vs15 13vs15 
Coefficient (B) 2.35 11.37 8.03 




















































                                                                   CHAPTER 3 
3.1 STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
The study in this chapter looks at the effects of the Medicaid expansion on health outcomes, 
healthcare utilization and access to healthcare through the Center of Disease Control's Behavioral 
Risk Factor Surveillance System.  
 
3.2 RESEARCH QUESTION 
Does the Medicaid Expansion Cause an increase in healthcare access, healthcare utilization, and 
positive health outcomes among newly insured Medicaid patients? 
 
3.3 INTRODUCTION 
There have been mixed results concerning whether or not insuring Medicaid has benefits 
(Gruber, 2008). Previous research in the 1980s showed a reduction in mortality among infants 
and children.  However, research has shown that Medicaid recipients are sicker than non-
Medicaid recipients.  Additionally, Medicaid recipients have a harder time accessing healthcare 
than non-Medicaid recipients. One randomized trial experiment in Oregon has shown 
improvements to health outcomes, access to health, and self-reported health (Finklestein et al., 
2015). Medicaid traditionally covers the poor, pregnant women, and persons with disabilities. 
Previous research has shown that the expansion of Medicaid has reduced mortality and increase 
health utilization. The ACA expanded coverage to people with incomes below 138% of the 
federal poverty line. I use this natural quasi-experiment to determine whether state expansions of 




expansion would reduce mortality and increase healthcare utilization among lower income 
populations. 
This chapter utilizes a difference-in-difference approach to compare several measures of 
health care utilization and health outcomes between individuals in expansion states versus non-
expansion states. The assumption underlying this approach is that healthcare trends in expansion 
states should be different than non-expansion states. Since the Medicaid expansion was a large 
increase in access for Medicaid eligible recipients, health utilization, mortality, and health 
outcomes should improve (Finklestein et al, 2015).   
 
3.4 LITERATURE REVIEW OF PUBLIC INSURANCE EXPANSION ON HEALTH 
Government health insurance expansion and health has been closely researched to see the 
relation. Many factors affect health insurance status and health status in determining the impact 
of the two. Lacking health insurance can increase the risk of mortality (Franks et al., 1993). 
Kasper et al. (2000) conducted a longitudinal study to examine the consequences of losing and 
gaining health insurance coverage for access to care and health. The authors found that uninsured 
people who gained coverage showed improvement across all indicators of access, in contrast to 
those who remained without insurance. Furthermore, they found that health insurance coverage 
has a substantial impact on the ability to gain access to medical care.  There is strong evidence 
that public insurance expansion increases healthcare utilization services which can improve 
health outcomes and access to health. The Massachusetts healthcare reform, or Romney Care, 
was a model for the Affordable Care Act. It was enacted in 2006 and signed under then Governor 
Mitt Romney. More than seven percent of Massachusetts residents lacked health insurance 




(Long et al., 2012). Furthermore, preventable hospital rates decreased from 101 per 100,000 
admissions to 83 per 100,000 (Joynt et al., 2012).   
A systematic review of U.S. public health insurance expansions resulted in a causal relationship 
between health insurance and healthcare utilization and/or health outcomes consistently show 
that health insurance increases utilization and improves health. Specifically, health insurance had 
substantial effects on the use of physician services, preventive services, self-reported health 
status, and mortality, conditional on injury and disease (Freeman et al., 2008). 
 
3.5 MEDICAID’S EFFECT ON HEALTH OUTCOMES 
Several studies have been conducted on health outcomes and insurance.  The research 
focuses on private, public (through Medicare or Medicaid), or no insurance. Sommers et al. 
(2013) found significant gains in access to Medicaid insurance for young adults. They used data 
from two nationally representative surveys, comparing young adults who gained access to 
dependent coverage to a control group (adults ages 26 to 34) who were not affected by the new 
policy. They found coverage gains for adult’s ages 19 to 25. A Michigan study found Medicaid 
patients were twice as likely to after one month post-surgery than private insured patients (Waits 
et al, 2014). The authors noted Medicaid patients have worse health status, experience more 
complications, and use more resources than privately insured patients. Waits et al. also found 
Medicaid patients to be younger and more likely to be female and non-white than were privately 
insured patients. They found rates of smoking, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and 
peripheral vascular disease among Medicaid patients to be double compared to private insured 
patients. Medicaid patients underwent 21% more emergent operations, experienced 67% more 




Han X et al. (2015) found that low-income adults in Medicaid non expanding states, who 
are disproportionately represented by blacks and rural residents, were worse off for multiple 
health-related outcomes compared to their counterparts in Medicaid expanding states at the 
baseline of ACA implementation. The findings suggest that low-income adults residing in non-
expanding states may benefit markedly from the expansion of Medicaid. 
Similarly, a University of Virginia Study found that Medicaid and uninsured patients 
were twice as likely to die than private insured patients (LePar et al., 2010). They also found that 
Medicaid patients were more likely to have post-treatment complications, as they stayed in the 
hospital an average of 10.5 days, compared to 7 days for the uninsured and 7.4 days for the 
privately insured.  
The results of these studies have to be interpreted in proper context. Medicaid is coverage 
that people characteristically go on and off of compared to private insured patients. What was 
controlled in most studies, Medicaid patients were not likely to have coverage for a long time 
and have underlying illnesses. However, how well they were treated before cannot be controlled. 
The Medicaid population has different characteristics than privately insured patients. Medicaid 
patients have a number of characteristics that put them at a higher risk of mortality. Medicaid 
enrollees have greater poverty rates and have much higher rates of mental and physical health 
problems, which are likely contributors to higher mortality rates (Bradley et al., 2002; Demone et 
al, 2003; Watson, 1995). The facilities and treatment where Medicaid patients received care may 
have lacked quality of care or lacked resources.  
Another interpretation is that Medicaid patients receive a lower quality of care than 




lower quality of care due to the reasons above. Without a random assignment of individuals into 
Medicaid, it is difficult to interpret which explanation is appropriate. 
There is evidence from several studies that Medicaid patients increase health utilization 
when insured. Children were found to have an increase in the utilization of Medicaid's medical 
services. Medicaid insurance improved utilization of medical services (Fisher and Mascarenes, 
2007). Marquis and Long (1996) found that Medicaid beneficiaries use considerably more 
ambulatory care and inpatient care than they would if they remained uninsured. Lower cost 
sharing would enable Medicaid patients to utilize healthcare services. One study found that 
Medicaid adults and children had greater use of prescription drugs than the privately insured. 
Moreover, Medicaid patients utilize healthcare services at a lower expenditure compared to 
private insured patients (Ku, 2009). However, although increased access to Medicaid insurance 
causes higher utilization of healthcare services, Medicaid patients are significantly poorer, in 
worse health, and more likely to be members of racial and ethnic minority groups (Dor et al., 
2008). 
Dor et al. (2008) also found that despite the higher risk nature of Medicaid patients, 
health centers achieve significantly higher levels of preventive health care for these patient 
populations’ preventives services – such as screening for diabetes and hypertension – and 
preventive health screenings for breast and cervical cancer. Although evidence may suggest 
Medicaid patients are more likely to die than private insurers, there is evidence that Medicaid 
patients utilize health services when insured. 
The Oregon Health Plan is a public insurance which many low-income residence depend 
on for healthcare. In 2008, The Oregon public health insurance, Oregon Health Plan, decided to 




line.  Due to budgetary constraints, Oregon only had enough money to fund about 3,000 new 
enrollees, so it decided to allocate spots using a lottery.  
Since the lottery to allocate spots randomly determined Medicaid eligibility, it allowed 
researchers an opportunity to determine the effect of enrollment into Medicaid on healthcare 
utilization and health outcomes. Furthermore, it created an opportunity for researchers to conduct 
a randomized experiment comparing the control group and treatment group.  The control group 
consisted of previously uninsured, Medicaid individuals who qualified for the lottery but failed 
to win. The treatment group consisted of uninsured, Medicaid individuals who qualified for the 
lottery and won. Several researchers have begun to collect data and analyze the impact of 
Oregon’s Medicaid experiment. During the first year of the expansion, Finklestien et al. found 
that Medicaid enrollment led to significantly greater health care utilization. This included a 30% 
increase in the probability of a hospital admission, a 15% increase in the probability of taking a 
prescription drug, and a 35% increase in the probability of having an outpatient visit. They also 
found a 60% increased likelihood of receiving recommended preventive care, a 25% decrease in 
the probability of having an unpaid medical bill sent to a collection agency, and a 35% 
probability of having any out-of-pocket medical expenditures. 
Furthermore, Medicaid enrollees reported higher self-reported health and greater use of 
several preventive care services. This resulted in an increase in the number of prescription drugs 
received and office visits made in the previous year. There were increases in some preventive 
care and screening services, including cholesterol screening, and improved perceived access to 
care, including a usual place of care (Baicker et al, 2013). The study had significant limitations.  
The results are not generalizable because it took place in Oregon and in the Portland area.  Also, 




be powerful to have significance.   
 
3.6 DATA 
I utilize a difference-in-difference approach to measure the impact of Medicaid expansion 
and nationwide compare the utilization of health care services and health outcomes. The 
Medicaid expansion, with the mandate that every U.S. citizen needs to be insured, significantly 
impacted the health care system in the United States. Second, states that chose to expand 
Medicaid increased their federal poverty line to 133%. The Medicaid expansion fits the quasi-
experimental model because there is both a treatment group (expansion states) and a control 
group (neighboring non-expansion states). With the increase in access to care through the 
Medicaid expansion, expansion states should see a higher utilization of healthcare services. Non-
expansion states should continue to see the same trend of healthcare utilization. 
The Center Control for Disease (CDC) Statistics is a national database composed of 
health service statistics. The CDC is a nationwide database that collects data for certain health 
outcomes. The Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System is a nationwide database, through the 
CDC, that collects data on health outcomes such as mortality, access to care, self-health reports, 
and self-health utilization.  There are numerous variables, but some utilization measures 
include: trends covering insurance coverage, regular doctor check-ups, prohibitively high 
medical costs, blood pressure and cholesterol checks, flu shots, self-reported health, and 
mortality rates.   
I used six questions from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) 
survey to measure health care access, utilization of health care services, and health outcomes. In 




responses to whether they needed to see a doctor in the past year but did not because of cost. In 
order to measure utilization of health care services, I used individuals’ responses about the length 
of time since they last saw a doctor for a routine check-up, the length of time since they last took 
their blood pressure medicine, the length of time since they last had their cholesterol checked, 
and whether they received a flu shot during the past year.  
This study will use data from two years before the expansion (pre-ACA) and two after 
the expansion. The BRFSS data, compiled by the Centers for Disease Control, is the world’s 
largest telephone health survey system with a new sample of individuals selected each year. 
There are over four hundred thousand respondents each year. Over 100 questions are asked 
annually or biennially in each state. The BRFSS collects information on healthcare utilization, 
healthy behaviors, and preventive health. I compiled data from two years before the Medicaid 
expansion (2014) and two years after the Medicaid expansion. In order to ensure consistency in 
the questions over time, I limited the study to data after 2011. I collected data through 2016 in 
order to have an equal number of years before and after the Medicaid expansion. The years I 
collected before the expansion are 2012 and 2013. The years I collected after the expansion are 
2015 and 2016. BRFSS most recent assessment is 2016. That factored into my decision to do a 
two-year time span to keep consistency. Moreover, the more time that passes after the Medicaid 
expansion, the more other factors are responsible for healthcare utilization and across the states. 
I excluded the year 2014 because of the new enrollees signing up for the Medicaid 
expansion that year.  The dataset consists of over 400,000 observations per year which represent 
the responses of non-elderly adults from expansion states versus non-expansion states.  
However, to keep consistency with my hypothesis, I conducted an analysis on the excluded year 




will be signing up that year and the collection of data will not be stable compared to the years 
after 2014. There will be inconsistencies with the overall results. The year 2014 is a confounding 
variable and will not exhibit any results significant to the study. 
 
3.7 METHODS 
Figure 3.1: Difference-in-Difference method 
  
 
          The difference-in-differences regression method (Figure 3.1) is the appropriate method for 
this study. It is a method from a time panel series to measure from treatment and control groups 
to obtain an appropriate counterfactual to estimate a causal effect. This method is defined where 
outcomes are observed for two groups for two time periods. One of the groups is exposed to a 
treatment in the second period but not in the first period. The second group is not exposed to the 
treatment during either period. In the case where the same units within a group are observed in 
each time period, the average gain in the second (control) group is subtracted from the average 
gain in the first (treatment) group. 
          I calculated a difference-in-difference to get a calculation of Medicaid expansions effect 
on health outcomes, access, and utilization. Difference in difference calculations were used to 
find the difference between expansion states and non-expansion states. The first differences were 




expansion states. To calculate the difference, I subtracted the pre-Medicaid expansion period 
estimate (means for each of the five measures using 2011 to 2012 data) from the post-Medicaid 
expansion period (means for each of the seven measures using 2015 and 2016 data). The two 
estimates produce an underlying result for Expansion states and Non-expansion States. The 
second difference is the result of the Medicaid expansion states subtracted by the result in non-
expansion states. This second difference is an estimate of the impact of the Medicaid Expansion. 
Due to the historic nature of a public insurance expansion nationwide, self-reports may have not 
been counted due to under reporting. 
 
3.8 MODELING 
The effect of the Medicaid expansion and its effects on uncompensated care can be 
depicted with this difference-in-difference linear regression equation: 
 
Yit=αi+λt+ρDit+X′itβ+ϵit   (DID Equation) 
 
           Yist = α + γEXPs + λdt + δ(EXP *dt) + εist (Eq. 1) 
Y is the continuous outcome variable for a BRFSS variable (i) in time period(t). 
Treatment is a dummy variable on whether the hospital is in the expansion state (treatment 
group) or not (control group). Expansion (EXP) is a dummy which is equal to 1 if the 
observation is from expansion. The coefficient on the difference-indifferences interaction, δ , is 
the difference estimator that identifies differential time trends in BRFSS variable between  







Table 3.1 shows the difference-in-difference estimates of the Medicaid expansions impact on 
expansion states and non-expansion States. 
A difference-in-difference analysis is used to explain that the expansion states would 
have had a change that was observed in the rest of the region with Medicaid expansion. The 
difference attributable to the Medicaid expansion is the gain in coverage (5%) minus the gain in 
coverage in the non-expansion states (3.9%). Therefore, from the difference-in-difference 
estimates, I find the Medicaid expansion caused an additional 1.1% of expansion state’s 
population to report having health insurance coverage.  
The difference attributable to the Medicaid expansion is the increase in individuals’ 
responses about the length of time since they last saw a doctor for a routine check-up (1.8 
percent) minus the gain in coverage in non-expansion states (2 percent). Therefore, from the 
difference-in-difference estimates, I find the Medicaid expansion caused an additional 0.20 
percent decrease in the length of time since they saw a doctor for a routine checkup.  
The difference attributable to the Medicaid expansion is the decrease when patients last 
took their blood pressure medicine (-0.3 percent) minus the decrease when patients’ last took 
their blood pressure medicine in non-expansion states (-1 percent). Therefore, from the 
difference-in-difference estimates, I find the Medicaid expansion caused an additional 0.70 
percent increase when the patients last took their blood pressure medication.  
The difference attributable to the Medicaid expansion is the decrease in individuals’ 
responses about cost being a factor if a patient needed to see a doctor (2.7 percent) minus the 




difference-in-difference estimates, I find the Medicaid expansion caused an additional 0.40 
percent decrease in the percentage of individuals in the state who needed to see a doctor within 
the last 12 months, but did not because of cost. 
The difference attributable to the Medicaid expansion is the increase when individuals 
last had their cholesterol checked (6.4 percent) minus the increase when individuals last had their 
cholesterol checked in non-expansion states (5.8 percent). Therefore, from the difference-in-
difference estimates, I find the Medicaid expansion caused an additional 0.60 percent of 
expansion state’s population to report having their cholesterol checked.  
The difference attributable to the Medicaid expansion is the increase in flu shots (1.9 
percent) minus the increase in flu shots in the non-expansion states (1.9 percent). Therefore, 
from the difference-in-difference estimates, I find the Medicaid expansion caused no change in 
percentage of expansion state’s population flu shots.  
In the years after the Medicaid expansion’s enactment, a greater number of expansion 
individuals increased access to health insurance, blood pressure medication and cholesterol 
checks (p=1.39E-12) relative to individuals in non-expansion states.  
Expansion states experienced a decrease in the percentage of individuals in the state who needed 
to see a doctor in the last 12 months, but did not because of cost. (p<.001) 
The results do suggest, however, that fewer individuals from expansion states received a regular 
doctor checkup relative to individuals in the control states. There was little, if any, change in the 
number of individuals in expansion states who had a flu shot within 12 months after the 
Medicaid expansion. This unexpected result may be attributed to individuals finding out they had 




A separate analysis confirms my hypothesis that the year 2014 shows statistical 
significance showing no change in individuals’ responses about cost being a factor if a patient 
needed to see a doctor but did not due to cost or a decrease in health coverage in expansion 
states. The difference attributable to the year 2011 and 2014 is the decrease in costs (-1.7 
percent) minus the decrease in costs in the non-expansion states (-1.7percent). Therefore, from 
the difference-in-difference estimates, I find the years 2011 and 2014 caused no change in 
percentage of expansion state’s population response about cost being a factor if a patient needed 
to see a doctor but did not due to cost.  
The difference attributable to the year 2011 and 2014 is the gain in coverage (1.8%) 
minus the decrease in coverage (2.2%). Therefore, from the difference-in-difference estimates, I 
find the years 2011 and 2015 caused a decrease of 1.1% of expansion state’s population to report 
having health insurance coverage.  
These results confirm my hypothesis and adjustment that the year 2014 will not show any 
significance due to the population signing up for healthcare and will not show any immediate 
results in the data. 
3.10 LIMITATION 
This study has several limitations. Using the Medicaid expansion as a natural quasi-experiment 
has disadvantages in mitigating outside influences. Confounding between exogenous variables 
such as insurance and demographics can hinder the results. I compared expansion states and non-
expansion states. My results may not be generalizable to other states because of demographic, 
political, and economic factors. The BRFSS dataset did not allow us to control for individual-
level characteristics other than race, sex, and age. In conclusion, my results offer new evidence 




utilization. Federal and state policymakers should take notice that major changes in Medicaid, 
either the expansion or reduction in coverage, may have significant ramifications on the health of 
vulnerable populations. Interestingly, non-expansion states have exhibited slight increases in 
healthcare access, health utilization, and health outcomes. This can be attributed to the ACA’s 
mandate that everyone is required to have health insurance or pay a penalty. The health insurance 
exchange (HIX) is an explanation for the increase in health utilization and healthcare access. In 
conclusion, this study is supported by the difference-in-difference method that offers evidence 
that the expansion of Medicaid coverage increases healthcare utilization and access to healthcare 
compared to non-expansion states. The BRFSS dataset does not have specific data to control for 
confounding variables. For example, economic theory suggests the law of supply and demand 
where states may have more of supply of doctors to perform services to the increase of Medicaid 
patients. The reports may be due to the additional services doctors perform in expansion states 
compared to non-expansion states.   The BRFSS data analytics has limitations as a telephone 
survey than a face to face. Telephone survey populations are documented to be different than 
non-telephone populations (Groves & Kahn, 1979). Telephone surveys are known to have bias 
such as under reporting physical health diagnosis questions such as body weight.  The potential 
for bias arises in self-reported survey studies and should account for misrepresentation of data. 
 
3.11 DISCUSSION 
My study documents that the Medicaid expansion is significantly associated with 
increased healthcare outcomes, healthcare utilization, and access to healthcare, as compared with 




The results show evidence of a mortality reduction associated with state Medicaid 
expansions for adults. These results build upon previous findings that Medicaid coverage is 
consistent with the preliminary results of the Oregon healthcare expansion, which showed 
increases in self-reported health (Baicker et al, 2013). The evidence suggests that utilization of 
preventive care increased in expansion states after the Medicaid expansion as more Medicaid 
recipients received blood pressure checks and regular primary care checkups relative to the non-
expansion states. 
A documented effect of an expansion of public insurance can be attributed to crowd out. 
Crowd out is the effect that individuals would drop their existing employer or individual market 
coverage and instead enroll in Medicaid through the expansion. Crowding out private health 
insurance may have a negative impact on health overall. It is well documented that the quality of 
care is higher on private health care insurance than Medicaid (Bradley et al., 2002; Demone et al, 
2003; Watson, 1995).  Also, the issue of crowd out is exacerbated by a looming problem of a 
national shortage with primary care physicians (Petterson et al, 2012). By increasing the demand 
for medical care, while supply remains relatively constant, the quality of care received by 
patients may decline. Furthermore, crowding out may affect patients who are sicker than newly 
insured patients. Newly insured patients may not have sought medical care if they remained 
uninsured and would have freed time and space for healthcare providers with more serious 
needs.  However, a fundamental flaw to the theory of crowd out is the assumption that 
individuals go from private to public insurance.  The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 
defines “crowd-out” to include all individuals who are uninsured when they enroll in Medicaid. 
They are not individuals with private insurance who voluntarily dropped for public program 




substitutes.  Further evidence suggests that the expansion of public insurance does not produce 
crowd out because participation increases baseline coverage rates (Hamersma & Kim, 2013). 
The Medicaid expansion and crowd would be a worthy topic for future research. 
Exogenous variables may need to be explored for further research. Medicaid patients 
have worse health outcomes than private or uninsured patients. The social determinants of health 
with the Medicaid population contribute to poorer health outcomes (Bradley et al., 2002; 
Demone et al., 2003; Watson, 1995). Moreover, research has shown that access to healthcare 
contributes relatively little, on average, to an individual’s overall health. McGinnis et al. (2002) 
estimated that social circumstances, behavioral patterns, and genetic predispositions account for 





































Figure 3.3: DID of Health Plan 
 
 


























Table 3.1: Impact of Medicaid Expansion 
Table 3.1: Impact of Medicaid Expansion the data come from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System. Non-expansion states are 
the control States. HLTHPLAN1 refers to the percentage of individuals in the state who self-report that they have insurance coverage. 
COST refers to the percentage of individuals in the state who needed to see a doctor in the last 12 months, but did not because of cost. 
CHECKUP1 measures the percentage of individuals who have had a routine doctor checkup in the last two years. FLUSHOT measures the 
percentage of individuals who have had a flu shot in the past year. BPRMED measures the percentage of individuals who have taken their 
blood pressure medication within the past year. CHCHECK measures the percentage of individuals who have had their cholesterol checked 
within the past two years. The 2011 to 2012 average is the average of the variables in the expansion states and non-expansion states. The 
2015 to 2016 average is the average after the Medicaid expansion. The first difference is the trend in Expansion states and non-expansion 
states. The difference-in-difference is the trend in the non-expansion states subtracted by the trend in expansion states. Appendix A 
includes the questions and responses from the BRFSS. Appendix A includes questions asked. 
**p<.1.39E-12       *p<.001 
Expansion States HLTHPLN1 CHECKUP BPMED FLUSHOT CHOCHECK MEDCOST 
11-15 AVG   4.70% 1.70%         n/a 2.50%                 n/a -3% 
12-16 AVG   5.10% 2% -0.30% 1.30% 6.40% -3% 
                
Non-expansion States HLTHPLN1 CHECKUP BPMED FLUSHOT CHOCHECK MEDCOST 
11-15 AVG   4.10% 2%         n/a 3.60%                 n/a -2.60% 
12-16 AVG   3.70% 2% -1% 0.30% 5.80% -2% 
                
    HLTHPLN1 CHECKUP BPMED FLUSHOT CHOCHECK MEDCOST 














Table 3.2: Analysis of 2011 vs 2014 
Analysis of 2011 vs 2014     
2011  MEDCOST HLTHPLN1 
Expansion States  11.9% 88.9% 
Non-Expansion States  13.6% 87.1% 
Difference  -1.7% 1.8% 
      
2014     
Expansion States  12.1% 87% 
Non-Expansion States  13.8% 89.2% 
Difference  -1.7% -2.2% 
      
DID  0 -0.04 


















                                                                 CHAPTER 4 
 
4.1 STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
The study in this chapter looks at the effects of the Medicaid expansion uncompensated care and 
Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) payments.   
 
4.2 RESEARCH QUESTION 
With an increase in newly insured Medicaid patients, does this cause a decrease in 
uncompensated care? 
With an increase in newly insured Medicaid patients, does Medicaid Disproportionate Share 
Hospital payments decrease? 
 
4.3 INTRODUCTION 
This study examines the association between hospital uncompensated care (UC) and 
reductions in Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH). There has been an increase of 
uninsured individuals in the United States. From 1987 to 2010, the number of uninsured 
increased dramatically from 31 million to 51 million individuals (US Census Bureau 2010). With 
the increase of uninsured individuals, health care costs have been substantially increasing 
through uncompensated care.   
The cost of uncompensated care has tripled in the past 20 years (CMS, 2016). This is due 
to a growing population of individuals who do not have health insurance. Uncompensated care is 
a term used for uninsured individuals who seek charity care or care that has been written off as 




Association (Figure 4.1), uncompensated care cost 11 billion in 1990 and 44 billion in 2011. 
That is about a fourfold increase.  In order to alleviate the burden of debt, hospitals rely on 
support from the government (federal, state, local) or from private donors.  
New York, for example, is a state with the highest rate of uninsured individuals and thus 
historically received the largest amounts of Medicaid DSH payments. New York was also 
substantially affected by the ACA, with its state-specific federal Medicaid DSH allotment 
declining from $1.6 billion 2010 in 2003. 
 




Source: American Hospital Association Fast Facts on Uncompensated Care 
 
Safety net hospitals are the last line of opportunity for populations seeking healthcare. 




hospitals take an enormous amount of uncompensated care due to the lack of insurance. The 
Federal Government provides funding to hospitals to treat disproportionate individuals through 
the disproportionate funding programs, under which facilities are able to receive at least partial 
compensation. Medicaid disproportionate share hospitals (DSH) are hospitals that serve a large 
number of Medicaid and low-income uninsured patients. States make additional payments (DSH 
payments) to safety net hospitals “to improve the financial stability of safety-net hospitals and to 
preserve access to necessary health services for low-income patients” (MACPAC, March 2014 
Report to Congress). The Medicaid DSH program provides essential financial assistance to 
hospitals that care for the nation's most vulnerable populations. 
 






The Medicaid DSH program accounted for approximately 4.9% of total Medicaid 
expenditures in 2009 and 2% in 2016 (CMS, 2016). The Medicaid DSH program, in 2015, 
provided a total of $35.7 billion in uncompensated care (AHA, 2016). In the early 1990s, 
Medicaid DSH payments expanded rapidly. Medicaid DSH spending grew from less than $1 
billion in 1990 to more than $17 billion in 1992. In 2016, it is now at $45 billion. The Affordable 
Care Act mandated that Medicaid disproportionate-share hospital funds be cut by $43 billion 
between fiscal year (FY) 2018 and 2025. During Congressional sessions, hospital lobby groups 
negotiated the cuts under the assumption that expanded coverage from the healthcare reform law 
would reduce the need for the funding.  
Congress delayed the cuts, which were supposed to start in FY 2014, after hospitals 
lobbied that increased patient traffic was not outpacing uncompensated-care costs.  The DSH 








The first Medicaid DSH cuts will start with $2 billion in FY 2018 and increase $1 billion 
increase every FY leveling off at $8 billion for FY 2024-FY2025. The reduction of Medicaid 
DSH payments presents a significant challenge to non-expansion states. 
My study examines how changes in Medicaid DSH payments through the Affordable 
Care Act would affect hospital provisions of uncompensated care in expansion states.   
This study will also make an inference on the sustainability of the reduction of Medicaid DSH 




examine the issue of sustainability in the decreases in uncompensated care costs due to the ACA 
insurance expansion which may not match the ACA’s DSH reductions because of the high 
number of uninsured patients and low Medicaid reimbursement. Overall, this study aims to 
observe the effects of uncompensated care costs and Medicaid DSH payments in expansion and 
non-expansion states.   
 
4.4 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Health economic theory suggests that the increase in access of Medicaid insurance would 
reduce uncompensated care costs. This has become an important public policy issue and the 
Medicaid expansion had questions of sustainability with shortages healthcare services. However, 
numerous studies have shown effects of expanding public insurance with uncompensated care.   
The financial ramifications of uncompensated care are unprecedented for the healthcare 
industry. The need to account for the uninsured, disproportionate, and indigent 
populations, continues to increase at a high rate. Emergency room treatment of undocumented 
immigrants and $934 million of uncompensated care charges for 23 hospitals in a Texas county, 
which translates to $353 million of UCC (Coustasse et al., 2010). Garthwaite, et al. (2015) found 
increases in the uninsured population lowers hospital profit margins, which suggests that 
hospitals cannot simply pass along all increased costs onto privately insured patients. Hospitals 
would have to write off the increased costs as bad debt or charity care. 
Blewett et al. (2003) studied an expansion of Minnesota’s insurance enrollment resulted 
in a 5-year cumulative savings of $58.6 million in hospital uncompensated care costs. LoSasso 
and Seamster (2007) found that expanding public health insurance eligibility for children and 




provision. Because the expansion fully took effect in 2014, there is preliminary data on its effects 
with uncompensated care.  
Health and Human Services reported through the second quarter of 2014, the Medicaid 
reimbursement would likely reduce hospital uncompensated care costs. In particular, volumes of 
uninsured/self-pay admissions, uninsured/self-pay emergency department visits will fall 
substantially through Medicaid expansion states, and projections suggest that uncompensated 
care costs will fall substantially following the Medicaid expansion (DeLeire et al., 2014). Early 
estimates indicate states would lose 3.6 million insured Medicaid patients and $8.6 million in 
federal payments (Price and Eibner, 2013). Dangrove et al. (2016) found variations of costs 
among expansion hospitals but evidenced a wide gap between non-expansion hospitals versus 
expansion hospitals. Nikpay, Buchmueller, and Levy (2015) found an increase of 7-8% points in 
Medicaid revenue as a share of total revenue, relative to a baseline share of 10%. Overall, they 
found uncompensated care in Connecticut was roughly one-third lower than with the early 
Medicaid expansion. Their results suggest that ACA Medicaid expansions could reduce 
hospitals’ uncompensated care burden.  
Preliminary literature review shows the effects of the Medicaid expansion on hospitals in 
expansion versus non-expansion states. Medicaid DSH/Safety net hospitals are the last line of 
opportunity for populations seeking healthcare. The population are characterized as poor, 
uninsured, elderly, and disabled. Safety net hospitals take an enormous amount of 
uncompensated care due to the lack of insurance. In the FY of 2018, Congress is set to reduce the 
amount of Medicaid DSH payments to safety net hospitals. These hospitals are vulnerable to the 




hospital.  These studies provide evidence that public insurance expansion reduces 
uncompensated care costs.  
This study is a quasi-experimental to test the impact of the Medicaid expansion in 
expansion and non-expansion states with an emphasis on Medicaid DSH hospitals.    
 
4.5 METHODS 
When examining the impact of the implementation or intervention in health policy, the 
question is to determine if the implementation of intervention caused the impact. The research 
topics will use a quantitative methodology (quasi-experimental design) that incorporate the 
implementation of the Medicaid expansion comparing expansion and non-expansion states.  
In the study of applied economic theory, I use a difference-in-difference analysis as a 
framework to examine the association between the hospital provision of uncompensated care and 
Medicaid DSH payments. 
Economic theory predicts that hospitals confronted with financial pressure as a result of 
payment reductions reduce their operating efficiency and revenue because they have fewer 
resources to invest in the processes of care, healthcare technology, and organizational processes 
of administration. 
 





The difference-in-differences method (Figure 4.4) would be an appropriate method for first 
model. This method is defined where outcomes are observed for two groups for two time 
periods. One of the groups is exposed to a treatment in the second period, but not in the first 
period. The second group is not exposed to the treatment during either period. In the case where 
the same units within a group are observed in each time period, the average gain in the second 
(control) group is subtracted from the average gain in the first (treatment) group.  
Uncompensated care is the main variable in studying change; do the expansion states see      
  a significant decrease in uncompensated care?  
Uncompensated care is not directly reported as a variable; however, it is calculated as 
total uncompensated care as the sum of charity care (care delivered with no expectation of 
payment) and bad debt (care that is billed but no payment is received). This is different from 
other studies that may measure uncompensated care by bed.  
        A logistic regression was used to determine the DSH expenditures between expansion states 
and non-expansion states 
 
4.6 DATA 
           Hospitals submit to the CMS worksheet S-10 to report uncompensated care costs from 
Medicare certified hospitals (n=9531). Every facility must complete an S-10 worksheet yearly 
and must pass CMS compliance. It is due one month after the fiscal year ends. From the cost 
report analysis of fiscal years 2011 and 2015, the parsing of data made several exclusions to 
account for sampling errors in my study.  Table 4.1 depicts an exclusion criteria table for this 
analysis: (1) self-employed hospitals and clinics, hospitals that submitted more than two cost 




same for all hospitals. A fiscal year is a period that hospitals use for accounting and financial 
statements.  Hospitals start their fiscal years on different months or days within a month.  For the 
purposes of this study, I counted hospital fiscal months that ended in November, December, and 
January. All hospitals (n=3633) with non-missing data for each of the observed years from 2011 
and 2015 were retained. 
Uncompensated care can be presented in numerous facets. CMS does not have a category 
specifically for uncompensated care. However, in my study, uncompensated care will be 
presented in through inpatient and outpatient costs. I use the American Hospital Association 
(AHA) calculation for uncompensated care as bad debt and charity care as charges per their 
Annual Survey. These two numbers are added together and then multiplied by the hospital's cost-
to-charge ratio, or the ratio of total expenses to gross patient and other operating revenue.  
In my analysis, I define uncompensated care as the sum of charity and bad debt, which is 
categorized as inpatient costs and outpatient costs.  
Disproportionate Share Hospital Payment was also obtained and will follow the same criteria. 
My hypothesis indicates DSH payments will decrease as uncompensated decreases. However, 
further research is needed to analyze weather uncompensated care eliminates the need for DSH 
cuts to start in the FY 2018.  
 
4.7 MODELING 
The effect of the Medicaid expansion and its effects on uncompensated care can be 






           Yit=αi+λt+ρDit+X′itβ+ϵit   (DID Equation) 
 
           Yist = α + γEXPs + λdt + δ(EXP *dt) + εist (Eq. 1) 
 
           Yit(group) = 1 / (1 + exp(- intercept – coefficient( β) *DSH(X))) (Eq. 2) 
 
       Y is the continuous outcome variable for a hospital (i) in time period(t). Treatment is a 
dummy variable on whether the hospital is in the expansion state (treatment group) or not 
(control group). Expansion (EXP) is a dummy which is equal to 1 if the observation is from 
expansion. The coefficient on the difference-indifferences interaction, δ, is the difference 
estimator that identifies differential time trends in uncompensated care between hospitals in 
expansion states and hospitals in non-expansion states. Eq. 2 compares Medicaid DSH hospitals 
in expansion states and non-expansion states through a logistic regression equation. Yit is the 
binary response variable for Expansion States and non-expansion state in Time period year (t).  
(β) is the regression coefficient. (X) is the explanatory variable which is DSH spending. The 
dependent variable which measures the Expansion state is equal to 1 and states that did not 
expand their Medicaid program is equal to 0. 
                                                       
4.8 RESULTS 
A statistics summary in Table 4.2 presents the regression analysis output for different 
quantitative responses. It the different output coefficient and how my two variables relate. In 
particular, the confidence interval is a range around measurements that convey how precise that 




 Regression results for are presented in tables 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5. My analysis includes two 
models examining the effect of the Medicaid expansion on hospital provision of uncompensated 
care. The first model includes hospitals in expansion states and non-expansion states, while the 
second model compares DSH payments in expansion states and non-expansion states. The first 
model indicated no statistical significance (p< 0.30) in uncompensated care between hospitals in 
expansion and non-expansion states. The results indicate the Medicaid expansion may have had 
substantial effect on uncompensated care between the unadjusted pre- and post-expansion 
averages in outcomes between hospitals in expansion and non-expansion states. From the 
difference-in-difference method, I calculated the increase in percentage of inpatient costs, out of 
patient costs, and overall costs. I compared the averages between expansion states and non-
expansions states ratio of costs. For the fiscal years 2011 and 2015, hospitals in expansion states 
had an average increase of 19% for uncompensated inpatient charges. In comparison, hospitals in 
non-expansion states averaged 20.16% uncompensated inpatient charges from 2011 and 2015. 
Therefore, from the difference-in-difference estimates, I find the Medicaid expansion caused an 
additional 1.16% decrease in inpatient costs.  For the same fiscal years, hospitals in expansion 
states had an average increase of 29.3% for uncompensated outpatient charges.  In comparison, 
hospitals in non-expansion states averaged 33.1% uncompensated outpatient charges from 2011 
and 2015. Therefore, from the difference-in-difference estimates, I find the Medicaid expansion 
caused an additional 3.8% decrease in outpatient costs. The second model indicates statistical 
significance (p<.006) in the reduction of DSH expenditures between expansion states and non-
expansion states.   Table 4.3 examined the logistic regression models comparing fiscal year 2011 
and 2015. The analysis was significant in the Medicaid expansion comparison years and 




spending. Comparing the years 2011 and 2015, The Medicaid Expansion caused a significant 
decrease in expenditure on Medicaid DSH spending among Expansion states. (Exp (β)=50.28, 
95% [0.15, 0.31]). Figure 4.5 shows the logistic regression between the fiscal year 2011 and 
fiscal year 2015. A separate analysis confirms my prediction that the year 2014 shows no 
statistical significance or association with Medicaid DSH spending. Table 4.6, Table 4.7, Figure 
4.6, and Figure 4.7 provide summaries and logistic regression graphic statistics for the year 2011 
and 2013 compared to 2014. 
 
4.9 LIMITATIONS  
The main strengths of my study are that I used a large national hospital dataset containing 
information on uncompensated care within a quasi-experimental framework, which allows me to 
control for trends. 
There are several limitations in my study due to limitations of my study design.  
First, the dataset on hospitals from the Medicare cost report had incomplete information. The 
generalizability may be limited to the extent of hospitals not representative of the study 
population. Hospital cost reports may have missing reports and non-response items with 
uncompensated care costs. In addition, CMS cost reporting is in fiscal years, and my study 
design was in calendar years. The fiscal years were adjusted in accordance to the timing of the 
Medicaid expansion.   
Second, because insurance coverage is an endogenous variable, my regression estimates 
represent correlations, not causal effects. Furthermore, the design is not a randomized control 
trial which represents correlation and not causality. Third, my analysis was at the population-




patient demographics, hospital types, and location (urban/rural); thus, the result of Medicaid 
expansion may differ across hospitals. 
Lastly, the allocation of treatment and control groups proved to be difficult. Objectively, 
the formal date for the Medicaid expansion was January 1, 2014.  However, some states 
expanded their Medicaid program earlier, later, or through the section 1115 waivers. States that 
expanded irregularly could have been allocated into the treatment of non-treatment group. 
However, due to confounding, the goal is to diminish factors that may contribute to bias through 
different types of expansions and/or timing of expansions.  
Since data was limited to the years of 2015, future studies should research comprehensive 
years to analyze the Medicaid expansions effects on Medicaid DSH payment cuts and 
uncompensated care.    
 
4.10 DISCUSSION 
With the Medicaid DSH Cuts to start in FY 2017, The ACA will reduce Medicaid DSH 
funding to hospitals which total to $18.1 billion within a span of ten years. Medicaid DSH 
hospitals may not be able to sustain the decreases on uncompensated care costs and may have 
devastating effects. Medicaid DSH hospitals may not be able to match the ACA’s DSH 
reductions because of the high number of uninsured patients and low Medicaid reimbursement. 
My study shows Medicaid DSH hospitals received a decrease in uncompensated care. Medicaid 
DSH hospitals in non-expansion states stayed relatively the same even after the expansion. With 
no relief of increased accessibility of insured patients, non-expansion states may have a more 
difficult time to cope with the scheduled payment cuts. Although there was no statistical 




uncompensated care than non-expansion states. Further research is needed to ensure the results 
were not due to chance. The second model showed statistical significance of the reduction of 
Medicaid DSH payment in expansion states versus non-expansion states. The increase in access 
to Medicaid alleviated the burden of safety net hospitals using their allotment of DSH funds from 
the federal government.  
          The present study applied the difference-in-difference methodology and logistic regression 
analysis to examine whether uncompensated care was reduced in expansion states versus non-
expansion states. There are several potential explanations for these findings that have 
implications to federal, state, and hospital administrators who are affected by the expansion or 
non-expansion. Uncompensated care is a straining issue from the federal level all the way to the 
grassroots. This is one of the initiatives the ACA tried to ameliorate by reducing costs incurred 
by uninsured emergency room visits. Hospitals in expansion states saw a reduction of 
uncompensated care relative to hospitals in non-expansion states, with Medicaid DSH hospitals 
who treat disproportionately more low-income population resulting in more gains. As the 
expansion came into effect in 2014, non-expansion states have seen their uncompensated care 
rise. Policymakers in non-expansion states in particular should take notice in the levels of 
uncompensated care and operating costs. It has been known that hospitals have had to close 
down their operations due to the unsustainable cost of uninsured payments and writing off bad 
debt or deeming the service as charity care (American Hospital Association, 2012). The 
additional amount of revenue from Medicaid could help alleviate the cost burden hospitals 
experience in particular with uncompensated care.  
With the FY 2018 looming, expansion and non-expansion states are projected to have 




financial wellbeing of these organizations.  When the ACA was passed, it mandated all states to 
expand their Medicaid program. However, the 2012 Supreme Court decision ruled the mandate 
unconstitutional. This is a major problem with the legislation because the original intent of the 
ACA assumed that the Medicaid expansion would increase coverage of previously uninsured 
individuals, resulting in less demand for uncompensated care in all states. After the Supreme 
Court decision, no amendments were taken into account with the projected DSH cut payments 
and with non-expansion states. The premise of the cuts were based on the original mandate 
accounting that all states expanded their Medicaid program. The decision of the Supreme Court 
caused an implementation failure, which has residual consequences on the non-expansion states. 
Based on this assumption, the ACA introduced cuts in federal DSH payments originally 
scheduled to begin in fiscal year 2014 but delayed until fiscal year 2018. The effects of the 
scheduled DSH payment cuts could have serious financial implications for hospitals in non- 
expansion states, as they depend on this funding to help offset the cost of providing care. 
Medicaid DSH hospitals in expansion states will also be affected by the reduced 
payments. Congressional leaders and hospital administrators have lobbied towards the delay of 
reduction of payment. They knew the reduction in payment was going to be financially negative 
since not all uncompensated care were going to be eliminated.  The legislation theorized that if 
you insured patients, a reduction of Medicaid DSH payments would be appropriate to offset the 
costs.  
However, Neuhausen et al. (2014) examined the effects of ACA DSH payment 
reductions on public hospitals in California and found that decreases in uncompensated care 
resulting from insurance expansions may not equal the payment cuts due to remaining uninsured 




study show the decline in uncompensated care; however, the decline in uncompensated care did 
not fully eliminate the gap. Graves (2012) simulated the payment DSH reductions and expanded 
access and found the payment cuts may not match the enrollment increase. Medicaid has a 
negative effect on payer reimbursement for public and private hospitals on an increase in 
Medicaid eligibility (Davidoff et al., 2000).  
Future analysis should observe how hospitals calculate the reductions in uncompensated 
care. The difference between uninsured patients and Medicaid patients is hospitals can dictate the 
difference in uninsured payment and the cost of treatment. Hospitals cannot count the difference 
between what Medicaid Pays for the cost of payment and the cost of service. This leads to 
hospitals overstating their financial interests because of how uncompensated care is measured 
(Nikpay et al., 2015). In conjunctions with miscalculating uncompensated care reporting, crowd 
out can have a distortion of financial standing in relation to uncompensated care. This may lead 
to crowding out private coverage for public insurance through the Medicaid expansion.  
Early evidence suggests crowd out may be a factor for hospitals financial reporting (Sommers et 
al., 2013). Because private insurers typically reimburse more generously than state Medicaid 
programs, shifts from private coverage to Medicaid would negatively affect Medicaid expansion 
hospitals’ financial reporting. 
Non-expansion DSH hospitals may have the same effect; however, the burden will be 
compounded with less Medicaid funds and more uncompensated care. Non-expansion state 
hospitals may find other alternatives to decrease the gap. However, the uncompensated care will 
continue to increase with the low income and uninsured population which will continue to seek 
care at the expense of the hospital. Hospitals become vulnerable to the treatment of the 




should consider how to ameliorate the issue of reduced DSH payment for uncompensated care in 























Table 4.1:Exclusion Criteria for Hospitals 
Exclusion Criteria 
Self Employed Hospitals (n=3) 
Standardization of Fiscal Years:  November, December, and January 
(N=3374) 
Submission of More than one Cost Report (n=157) 
No reports of Uncompensated Care (n=6) 




















Table 4.2: Summary Table 
Table 4.2 Summary Statistics 
 (11vs15) Expansion vs 
Non-Expansion State 
Count                                n=3633 
Median -0.18 
Fischer score  6 
AIC 28.5 
























Table 4.3: Difference-in-difference results 
Table 4.3: Difference-in-difference results on uncompensated care  
Expansion States   Inpatient   
Out 
Patient 
11-15 AVG   19%   29.30% 
          
Non-expansion states         
11-15 AVG   20.16   33.10% 
          






Table 4.4: Logistic Results for DSH Payment 
Table 4.4: Logistic Results for DSH Payment in expansion states versus non-expansion states 
States DSH11 DSH15 X11vs15 grp 
AL 177343642 44110263 -0.7513 0 
FL 785243479 194021034 -0.7529 0 
GA 333460241 78469421 -0.7647 0 
ID 30481928 9076114 -0.7022 0 
KS 60133844 16801849 -0.7206 0 
ME 44657774 11784667 -0.7361 0 






MO 211260762 52698142 -0.7506 0 
NE 47027612 11090203 -0.7642 0 
NC 433313930 100328445 -0.7685 0 
OK 158473683 34907712 -0.7797 0 
SC 175385901 45624450 -0.7399 0 
SD 29073962 9233541 -0.6824 0 
TN 252967586 67366194 -0.7337 0 
TX 938334717 208455835 -0.7778 0 
UT 34216765 9939281 -0.7095 0 
VA 198207608 55110277 -0.722 0 
WI 130306459 38107010 -0.7076 0 
WY 4275972 1288942 -0.6986 0 
AK 17737577 8303050 -0.5319 1 
AZ 176270236 56592807 -0.6789 1 
DE 35418499 12901380 -0.6357 1 
HI 24760182 7950941 -0.6789 1 
IN 202940387 67462026 -0.6676 1 
KY 245006139 74666999 -0.6952 1 
MD 249258891 105265178 -0.5777 1 
MA 274687715 98443674 -0.6416 1 
NY 1125443499 291113621 -0.7413 1 
NM 51548753 21602432 -0.5809 1 
ND 18340849 7643246 -0.5833 1 
OH 301843155 97187197 -0.678 1 





RI 24530245 9977981 -0.5932 1 
VT 18565362 4965602 -0.7325 1 
NV 67265847 34240793 -0.491 1 





Table 4.5: DSH Payment 2011-2015 
Table 4.5 Dsh Payment 
2011-2015 
Coefficient  50.28 































Table 4.6: Summary Table of 2011 vs 2014 
 (11vs14) Expansion vs 
Non-Expansion State 
Count                                n=3633 
Median -0..90 
Fischer score  4 
AIC 51.8 








Table 4.7: Summary Table of 2011 vs 2014 
 
 (13vs14) Expansion vs 
Non-Expansion State 
Count                                n=3633 
Median -1.27 
Fischer score  3 
AIC 53.8 









Figure 4.6: Graph of 2011 vs 2014 
 
 










The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (PPACA or ACA) is the first 
comprehensive health reform law enacted in U.S. modern history. Its passage was historic and is 
part of the legacy of former President Barack Obama (Stolberg and Pear, 2010). The ACA has 
been the first and most controversial comprehensive healthcare reform bill passed in the United 
States. It has been marked by deep political divide and public opinion. Unlike the Health 
Insurance Exchanges (HIX), the Medicaid expansion was a provision contested by Republicans 
since its inception because states choosing to expand would cede control to the Federal 
Government. However, only 26 states chose to expand their Medicaid program. More perplexing 
is two Republican states decided to expand, effectively going against their own party. 
Partisanship, the idea that Republicans refused to support any bill endorsed by President Obama 
and/or the Democratic Party, is one of the most common explanations given for opposition. I 
argue that focusing on partisanship obscures important aspects of the policymaking process. It 
ignores essentials elements of the functioning of our branches of government and actors 
influencing policy. Furthermore, passing the ACA through legislation is not successful on the 
grounds if the implementation of the legislation fails (Pressman and Wildvisky, 1973; Rogers, 
1995, Bardach, 1983). 
This policy process can affect many implementation aspects regarding economics, policy, 
and management as a result of the legislation. My dissertation focused on the effects of 
implementation on the economics, policy and health services of the Medicaid expansion.  




government and state government. Medicaid is a social program jointly funded by federal and 
state governments. The Constitution vests power to both the Federal and state governments to 
make health policy. Congress’ authority is limited to its exercise of enumerated constitutional 
powers while all other powers are reserved to the states. Each state’s context is also nested within 
the broader national context (U. S. Const. amend. XIX). Our founding fathers could not have 
envisioned from the Constitution’s inception, two hundred years later, a setting where national 
healthcare reform would be debated. The Supreme Court decided in favor of choice rather 
mandate for the expansion of Medicaid. 
The overall aim of my dissertation is to see the effects of the Medicaid expansion in three 
chapters. The Federal Government historically reimburses 50% of Medicaid spending in the 
wealthiest states and about 75% in the poorest states; additionally, the Federal Government has 
historically reimbursed an average of 55% of state Medicaid spending. Since the 1980s, federal 
grants to states has decreased substantially, and Medicaid has become the main method by which 
states could increase federal revenues. Because of the increased revenues from the Federal 
Government, the growth in Medicaid has been exponential. The results from Chapter 2 show that 
the impact of the enhanced matching rates the Medicaid expansion had on provider payment was 
the high correlation between the number of Medicaid recipients in a state’s program as well as 
state Medicaid spending with the percentage of state Medicaid spending reimbursed by the 
Federal Government (the state FMAP). 
The preceding chapters examine expansion states and non-expansion states, from before 
and after the expansion has taken place. States had until January 2014 to decide whether to 




the expanded Medicaid program for the first 3 years (100%) and 90% after that until 2022. “One 
cannot seek knowledge about an innovation until he or she knows it exits” (Rogers, 2003). State 
policymakers and officials recognize the incentive and benefits that come with the enhanced 
matching rate through other states expansion. Predictably, all states will eventually expand their 
Medicaid program.  
The third chapter assessed the health outcomes of the Medicaid expansion.   The results 
of the Medicaid expansion evidenced an increase in healthcare utilization through various 
services. I assessed the trends in several indicators of health care utilization, access to care, and 
outcomes for the Medicaid expansion states and non-expansion states. I found evidence that 
some measures of utilization (blood pressure checks, cholesterol checks, health coverage, and 
checkups with a doctor) increased in expansion states after the implementation of the Medicaid 
expansion.  
In my final chapter covers the impact of the Medicaid expansion on uncompensated costs 
from expansion states versus non-expansion states. Federal law requires that state Medicaid 
programs make disproportionate share hospital payments to hospitals that serve a large number 
of uninsured and Medicaid patients. Safety net hospitals are the last line of opportunity for 
populations seeking healthcare – a group that is characterized as poor, uninsured, elderly, and 
disabled. Medicaid DSH program provides essential financial assistance to hospitals that care for 
the nation's most vulnerable populations. The lawmakers’ rationale to reduce the Medicaid DSH 
reimbursement was due to the increase in the number of insured individuals would reduce the 
amount of uncompensated care.  However, this depends on a number of factors, including if 
newly-insured individuals are able to meet the cost-sharing obligations, the remaining uninsured 




reimbursement cuts, it is critical for policymakers at all levels of government to avoid shifting a 
large financial burden to states, localities, and hospitals. The findings also suggest that within 
expansion states, the variation in uncompensated care was reduced between hospitals that treat a 
disproportionate share of low-income patients and those hospitals that do not, with the former 
experiencing larger reductions. Early indicators from this study suggest the expansion reduced 
uncompensated care, but it did not eliminate it completely. Furthermore, within expansion states, 
Medicaid DSH hospitals uncompensated care costs decreased compared to non-Medicaid DSH 
hospitals.  The ACA’s Medicaid expansion would improve hospital’s financial position by 
reducing uncompensated care. As Congress sets to start the DSH payment cuts in FY 2018, this 
chapter leaves unanswered the effects of the DSH payment cuts on safety net hospitals.  This is a 
question worthy of future research.  
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the relationship between the causes of the 
implementation “gap.” More specifically, the Medicaid expansion states were chosen due to their 
political, geographic, and economic climate. The common problem exhibiting within these three 
studies is the implementation of the legislation. Federal lawmakers had a preconceived notion of 
how the legislation would be implemented. However, does the meaning intended by the 
Affordable Care Act (ACA) have the same meaning in the states chosen? For example, does the 
policy within the ACA in Washington D.C. have the same meaning that it does in Medicaid 
expansion states? Furthermore, does it have the same reception by hospital administrators, 
healthcare providers, federal and state policymakers, and constituents of the state? The 
implementation “gap” is the question of meaning of legislation and contextualizing it to its 
constituents.  Republican officials held town hall meetings in their respective states they 




hosted a town hall which featured the plan to repeal the Affordable Care Act (Phillips, 2017); 
some of his constituents were opposed to the repeal and wanted Senator Graham to “fix” the 
Affordable Care Act than repealing it.  Republican constituents may be opposed to the repeal of 
the ACA because insuring the uninsured empowers them to use healthcare and offers a perceived 
immunity from the costs of being uninsured. Insuring the uninsured may empower newly insured 
patients to seek healthcare instead of being attached to their local emergency department. 
It is important for federal and state policy makers to be aware of the implementation of 
the Medicaid expansion. One of the main conclusions in Roger’s Diffusion of Innovation is“One 
cannot seek knowledge about an innovation until he or she knows it exists” (Rogers, 2003). The 
success or failure of a policy relies on how the innovation is perceived and whether policymakers 
will decide to adopt the innovation. Each policymaker is a unique actor who has multiple reasons 
to adopt the innovation or not. This includes: political ideology, economic benefits, pressure 
from their constituents, etc. For example, although there are economic benefits for a state to 
expand Medicaid, a state may be opposed to expanding due to political ideology.  Furthermore, 
political ideology can become the primary reason for not expanding to the extent that state’s 
constituents will suffer the consequences.  Political actors act on a broad spectrum either for the 
interest of their constituents or for their own interest (Longest, 2016).  
Healthcare providers are also incentivized to take in Medicaid patients because the 
Affordable Care Act requires states to increase the professional Medicaid rate so that it is equal 
to Medicare’s level of reimbursement (Federal Register, 2012).  Increasing access to uninsured 
patients is going to increase the demand for healthcare. The primary care physician shortage has 
been a problem before the ACA and is exacerbated by the ACA’s mandates. To help ensure the 




qualified physicians Medicaid fees at least equal to Medicare rates for primary care services. 
(Garner, 2012). This action helps physicians to increase participation for Medicaid services and 
to support physician’s Medicaid expenses through increased reimbursement rates. Although 
mechanisms through the ACA accounted for the shortage of Primary Care Physicians, those 
policies may not be enough to ameliorate the issue due to the sheer volume of newly insured 
patients. Further research is needed to understand how the mandates of newly insured patients 
affect the quality of healthcare among patients and providers.   
 A Robert Woods Foundation study found various disadvantages non-expansion states 
incur for not expanding their Medicaid program: non-expansion states could reduce the number 
of uninsured by more than four million people collectively by expanding Medicaid; federal 
funding by $595.8 billion to $664.8 billion from 2018-2027, which translates to losing $7.14-
$7.75 in federal funding for each state dollar they would have invested in Medicaid; and reduce 
uncompensated care by  $22.5 billion to $27.9 billion over ten years. (Dorn & Buettgens, 2017) 
The results from my studies show non-expansion states at a clear disadvantage because of the 
lucrative benefits of the Medicaid expansion.  
However, some state policymakers in non-expansion states are opposed to the expansion 
because of economic inefficiency. Economic theory suggests increasing the federal share of 
Medicaid spending will increase the size of state Medicaid programs, and the ACA’s expansion 
may decrease overall economic efficiency. The savings from federal taxpayer dollars comes at a 
high cost to both expansion and non-expansion states. Although states may benefit from the 
increased federal dollars from the expansion in the short term, it may exacerbate the countries’ 
fiscal deficit in the long run.  




grow more rapidly than private insurance. Medicaid spending has been growing at about 8% per 
year, compared to economic growth of 2% (CMS, 2016).  Expanding Medicaid will accelerate 
spending from 550 billion dollars almost $1trilliondollars (CMS, 2016). Inevitably, the increase 
in insured patients will cause an increase to state’s healthcare budget. States manage to control 
Medicaid costs by limiting reimbursements to health care providers, which could limit access to 
care. However, Sommers & Gruber (2017) found that state budgets were insulated from 
increased state spending from the Medicaid expansion. Furthermore, they did see an increase in 
Medicaid expenditures, but the enhanced matching rates from the Federal Government covered 
the costs. They concluded that any changes to the federal contribution would put the expansion 
states at risk with other budgetary priorities.  
           As positive results showed the reduction of Medicaid DSH payments in expansion states, 
the expansion may not eliminate all of the uncompensated care.  Governors and state legislators 
may ask for more state funding to replace cuts in federal DSH payments (Owcharenko, 2012). 
The ACA attempted to turn a fee for service system into a quality metric rating healthcare 
system. However, by expanding Medicaid to millions who previously lacked insurance, 
taxpayers will brunt the costs as newly insured patients will utilize it more.  
          Currently, the Republican Party is working towards a block grant aid instead of the 
opening matching system currently in place with Medicaid. The Federal Government would 
provide a fixed amount of funds to states for their Medicaid program. This would incentivize 
states to use their Medicaid program more efficiently. Currently, the open matching system 
creates wasteful spending; however, the Democratic Party argues the open matching system is 
necessary because millions would lose coverage through the block grants and millions of dollars 




downturns (Chatterjee & Sommers, 2017). Republicans are also proposing to make changes to 
the Medicaid 1115 waiver, allowing states not to go through the long process of approval and 
giving more liberty to states, such as Indiana which implemented work requirements as a means 
to share the costs of acquiring Medicaid. If block grants were imposed by the current 
administration, further research would be needed to understand the economic effects of block 
grants to states. Although the democratic parties’ principle believes in the Federal Government 
taking more of an active role in people’s lives, including healthcare, the Republican Party 
believes the opposite. Underlying the political problems that plagues Medicaid, controversy 
among the Medicaid expansion brings questions about the opposition among governors and 
constituents.  
Southern states are among the poorest states with the lowest health outcomes in the 
nation. Even with fully funded support for the Medicaid expansion by the Federal Government, 
these states still reject the proposal, even though their constituents are the ones who are most in 
need.  Southern States such as Mississippi, Georgia, Alabama, Texas, Louisiana, Alabama, and 
South Carolina decided to not expand their Medicaid program. Health outcomes in these states, 
such as obesity and Child mortality, rank at the top. These states are riddled with poor health 
decisions, such as poor nutrition and smoking, and this leaves a double whammy effect on 
constituents on their finances and healthcare. A Robert Woods Foundation study finds that 
southern states would benefit most from broader Medicaid eligibility based on the higher levels 
of working poor in southern states who struggle to pay their medical bills (Tu & Cohen, 2009)    
Race, medicine, and healthcare have a history spanning back to the Civil War. Hospitals 
are seen as institutions to save lives; however, segregation within these institutions existed before 




and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are coupled together with healthcare. Dr. Martin Luther King, 
Jr. spoke to healthcare workers in Chicago against the injustice of the American Medical 
Association (AMA) and other organization regarding discriminatory practices against people of 
color, and such discrimination was fueling medical apartheid. King said, “Of all the inequalities 
that exist, the injustice in health care is the most shocking and inhuman” (Hill, 2007). The Civil 
Rights Movement coincided and fought against healthcare as a privilege for certain races or 
classes in society. The National Association Advancement of Colored people (NAACP), 
National Medical Association (NMA), and the Medical Committee of Human Rights (MCHR) 
formed an alliance because the AMA not only supported segregation, but it was also segregated 
itself (Washington et al, 2009). The passage of Medicare, a single payer system that covered the 
elderly, would create an amendment called the Title IV clause of the Social Security Act, which 
eliminated discrimination and ended segregation in hospitals. Healthcare and Medicine became 
bifurcated due to the Jim Crow laws in the 1800s. It continued during the Reconstruction Era, 
when the United States headed towards a private, decentralized, pensioned based healthcare 
system, while other countries were heading towards a nationalized, government-run healthcare 
system. More specifically, the United States opted to expand its segregated healthcare system 
towards local providers because of the racial segregation that existed during that time. This racial 
segregation led to a widening gap of health disparities on health outcomes such as mortality 
rates, healthy lifestyle, nutrition and diseases (Nelson, Sitith, Smedley, 2002). The objective of 
Lyndon B. Johnson's “war on poverty” included universal healthcare to provide healthcare to 
indigent populations with the help of civil rights groups. Specifically, these places included the 
southern states where the MCHR built community centers for the countries most destitute. The 




Medicare of 1965 in which the AMA and other organizations were opposed to universal 
healthcare. 
           The AMA had unprecedented influence and power to overturn healthcare reform since the 
Roosevelt-Truman presidency. The AMA threatened the administration with various tactics to 
drop healthcare reform with each administration up until Lyndon B. Johnson became President. 
Shortly after Dr. Martin Luther King’s death, the AMA opposed a bill introduced by the 
MCHR that would introduce a single payer system that ended the push equality of healthcare for 
all. What resulted was a privatized, employer-based third party payer system where the non-
elderly did not acquire such offers and had a high enough income to be left out of Medicaid. The 
southern states has deep ties to a racially segregate society in the past, and it is no coincidence 
that the people who are left out are often people of color. The topic of socialized medicine in this 
country cannot be separated from the topic of racism and classism. There are strong historical 
ties and pressure from the Deep South to reject the expansion of Medicaid.  
What the ACA accomplishes is highly divided after seven years since its inception. 
Political strife over the legislation was aggressive and has intensified over time. Republicans 
running for federal and state offices made repealing the ACA one of its major priorities since its 
passage. President Donald Trump, Senate Majority leader Mitch McConnell, Speaker of the 
House Paul Ryan, and the Republican Party have tried to repeal and replace the ACA. Even with 
Republican control over the house and senate, they have thus far failed.  Leaders in more than 
half the states fought the individual mandate and the Medicaid expansion all the way to the 
Supreme Court. Many states considered constitutional amendments or legislation to nullify the 
ACA in their state and the Republicans within the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate are 




                                                               REFERENCES 
 
Adamson, (2012). How would eliminating the mandate affect cost and premiums? Retrieved 
Octobor 21, 2016 from the RAND Corporation web site: 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9646/index1.html 
Allen, K. Medicaid and Private Health Insurance testimony before the House Committee on 
Energy and Commerce Health Subcommittee. (2004, March 18). Intergovernmental 
Transfers Have Facilitated State Financing Schemes. 
Baicker, K., Taubman, S. L., Allen, H. L., Bernstein, M., Gruber, J. H., Newhouse, J. P., & 
Finkelstein, A. N. (2013). The Oregon experiment—effects of Medicaid on clinical 
outcomes. New England Journal of Medicine, 368(18), 1713-1722. 
Bardach, Eugene. (1977). The implementation game: What happens after a bill becomes a law.  
       Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Blewett LA, Davidson G, Brown ME, & Maude-Griffin R. Hospital provision of uncompensated 
care and public program enrollment. Med Care Res Rev. 2003; 60(4):509–527. 
Bradley, C. J., Given, C. W., & Roberts, C. (2002). Race, socioeconomic status, and breast 
cancer treatment and survival. Journal of the National Cancer Institute, 94(7), 490-49. 
Brehm, J., & Gates, S. (1999). Working, shirking, and sabotage: Bureaucratic response to a   
        democratic public. Michigan: University of Michigan Press. 
Brynard, P. (2005). Policy implementation: Lessons for service delivery. Journal of Public 




Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services. (2016). 2016 Actuarial Report on the Financial 
Outlook for Medicaid. Retrieved from: 
https://www.cms.gov/ActuarialStudies/downloads/MedicaidReport2016.pdf 
Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services. (2017). 2017 Medicaid & Chips enrollment outlook 
Retrieved from the Medicaid website: https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/program-
information/medicaid-and-chip-enrollment-data/report-highlights/total-
enrollment/index.html 
Chatterjee, P., & Sommers, B. D. (2017). The Economics of Medicaid Reform and Block Grants. 
Jama, 317(10), 1007-1008. 
Congressional Budget Office. (January 2016). The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2016 to 2026. 
Retrieved from the CBO website: https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114th-congress-
2015-2016/reports/51129-2016Outlook.pdf. 
Coughlin, Teresa A. and Stephen Zuckerman. (2002). States’ Use of Medicaid Maximization 
Strategies to Tap Federal Revenues: Program Implications and Consequences (Urban 
Institute Discussion Papers). Retrieved from the Urban Institute website: 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/310525_DP0209.pdf. 
Coustasse, A., Lorden, A. L., Nemarugommula, V., & Singh, K. P. (2009). Uncompensated care 
cost: a pilot study using hospitals in a Texas county. Hospital topics, 87(2), 3-12. 
SAGE, New York, New York. 
DeLeire, T., Joynt, K., McDonald, R., and Takeaways, K. (2014). Impact of Insurance 
Expansion on Hospital Uncompensated Care Costs in 2014. Office of the Assistant 






DeMone, J. A., Gonzalez, P. C., Gauvreau, K., Piercey, G. E., & Jenkins, K. J. (2003). Risk of 
death for Medicaid recipients undergoing congenital heart surgery. Pediatric 
cardiology, 24(2), 97-102. 
DiIulio, John D., and John J. DiIulio, Jr. (1994). Principled Agents: The Cultural Bases of 
Behavior in a Federal Government Bureaucracy. Journal of Public Administration 
Research and Theory, 4(3), 277-318. 
Dranove, D., Garthwaite, C., and Ody, C. (2016). Uncompensated care decreased at hospitals in 
Medicaid expansion states but not at hospitals In nonexpansion states. Health Affairs, 
35(8), 1471-1479. 
Davidoff, A. J., LoSasso, A. T., Bazzoli, G. J., and Zuckerman, S. (2000). The effect of changing 
state health policy on hospital uncompensated care. Inquiry,37(3), 253- 267. 
Dor, A., Pylypchuck, Y., Shin, P., & Rosenbaum, S. J. (2008). Uninsured and Medicaid patients' 
access to preventive care: comparison of health centers and other primary care providers. 
Dorn S, Buettgens M. The Cost to States of Not Expanding Medicaid. Washington: Urban 
Institute; 2017 Published April 2017. 
Edwards, G., Barrett, A., & Peake, J. (1997). The legislative impact of divided 
government. American Journal of Political Science, 41(2), 545-563. 
doi:10.2307/2111776 
Ellsworth, J. B. (2000). Surviving changes: A survey of educational change models. Syracuse,  




Elazar, Daniel J. (1966). American federalism: A view from the states. New York: Thomas Y. 
Crowell Co. 
Federal Register 66670 (Nov. 6, 2012) 
Freeman, J. D., Kadiyala, S., Bell, J. F., & Martin, D. P. (2008). The causal effect of health 
insurance on utilization and outcomes in adults: a systematic review of US 
studies. Medical care, 46(10), 1023-1032. 
Garner, Craig B., Medicaid Expansion: Tracing the True Value of a Free Lunch (May 22, 2013). 
State Bar of California, Business Law News, Annual Review (2012). Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2268815 
Garthwaite, Craig, Tal Gross, Matthew J. Notowidigdo. 2015. “Hospitals as Insurers of Last 
Resort.” Working Paper. 
Hamersma, S., & Kim, M. (2013). Participation and crowd out: Assessing the effects of parental 
Medicaid expansions. Journal of health economics, 32(1), 160-171. 
Harris, D. M. (2003). Contemporary Issues in Healthcare Law and Ethics, 2d ed. Chicago: 
Health Administration Press. 
Fisher, M.A., Mascarenhas, A.K. (2007). Does Medicaid improve utilization of medical and 
dental services and health outcomes for Medicaid-eligible children in the United 
States?. Community Dent Oral Epidemiol, 35:263–271. 
Finkelstein, A., Taubman, S., Wright, B., Bernstein, M., Gruber, J., Newhouse, J. P., ... & 
Oregon Health Study Group. (2012). The Oregon health insurance experiment: Evidence 
from the first year. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127(3), 1057-1106. 
Finkelstein, A., Hendren, N., & Luttmer, E. F. (2015). The value of medicaid: Welfare analysis 




Franks P, Clancy CM, Gold MR. Health insurance and mortality: Evidence from a national 
cohort. JAMA.1993;270(6):737–741. doi:10.1001/jama.1993.03510060083037 
Government Accountability Office. High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-11-278 (Washington, 
D.C.: February 2011).  
Gray, V. (1976).  Innovation in the States: A diffusion study. The American Political Science 
Review, Vol. 67, No. 4 (Dec., 1976), pp. 1174-1185. 
Greve, M. (2015). Federalism and the Constitution: Competition versus Cartels. Arlington, VA: 
Mercatus Center at George Mason University. 
Groves RM, Kahn RL. Surveys by Telephone: A National Comparison with Personal 
Interviews, New York, NY: Academic Press; 1979. 
Gruber, J. (2008). Covering the uninsured in the U.S., Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of 
Economic Research. 
HealthCare.gov. Washington, District of Columbia: U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services. 
Hill, J. (2007). The Theology of Martin Luther King, Jr. and Desmond Mpilo Tutu. Springer. 
Hojnacki, M., & Kimball, D. C. (1998). Organized interests and the decision of whom to lobby 
in Congress. American Political Science Review, 92(4), 775-790. 
Holden, R.J. Annals of Emergency Medicine, 57(3), 265-278. 
Jacobson, P.D. & Wasserman, J. 1999. The implementation and enforcement of tobacco control 
laws: Policy implications for activists and the industry. Journal of Health Politics, Policy 
and Law. 24(3): 567-598. 
Jenkins-Smith, H. C., & Sabatier, P. A. (1994). Evaluating the advocacy coalition 




Joynt, K. E., Chan, D., Orav, E. J., & Jha, A. K. (2013). Insurance expansion in Massachusetts 
did not reduce access among previously insured Medicare patients. Health affairs, 32(3), 
571-578. 
Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured. Federal Core Requirements and State 
Options in Medicaid: Current Policies and Key Issues. Kaiser Family Foundation, April 
2011. 
Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF). (2012). Quick take: Who benefits from the ACA Medicaid 
expansion. Kaiser Family Foundation. 
Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF). 2014. “State Decisions for Creating Health Insurance 
Exchanges.” Retrieved from the KFF website: http://kff.org/health-reform/state-
indicator/health-insurance-exchanges/. 
Kaiser Family Foundation. Payments by Enrollment Group, FY 2016. Retrieved from the State 
Health Facts website: 
http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparemaptable.jsp?ind=858&cat=4. 
Kasper, J. D., Giovannini, T. A., & Hoffman, C. (2000). Gaining and losing health insurance: 
strengthening the evidence for effects on access to care and health outcomes. Medical 
Care Research and Review, 57(3), 298-318. 
King v. Burwell. (2015). 576 US _ (2015). Retrieved from 
     http:// supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/576/14-114/ 
Ku, L. (2009). Medical and dental care utilization and expenditures under Medicaid and private 
health insurance. Medical care research and review, 66(4), 456-471. 
Ku, L. (2007). “Crowd-Out” is not the same as voluntarily dropping private health insurance for 




Lawrence B. (2014). Comparing the legislative and judicial policies. in Daniel Mazmanian and 
Levinson, D. R., & General, I. (Eds.), Access to care: Provider availability in Medicaid 
managed care. Washington, DC: Office of the Inspector General, Department of Health 
and Human Services. 
Longest, B. B. (1994). Health policymaking in the United States. Ann Arbor, MI: AUPHA 
Press/Health Administration Press. 
National Governors Association and National Association of State Budget Officers. (February 
2010). State fiscal update. Washington (DC): NASBO. 
Nikpay, S., Buchmueller, T., and Levy, H. (2015). Early Medicaid expansion in Connecticut 
stemmed the growth in hospital uncompensated care. Health Affairs, 34(7): 1170- 1179. 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18001 et seq. (2010). 
Petterson, S. M., Liaw, W. R., Phillips, R. L., Rabin, D. L., Meyers, D. S., & Bazemore, A. W. 
(2012). Projecting US primary care physician workforce needs: 2010-2025. The Annals 
of Family Medicine, 10(6), 503-509. 
Public Health and Welfare Act of 1944, 42 §§ USCA Section 1301(a)(1) (2009). 
Stephen O., “GAO: U.S. government gave away $125 billion in questionable benefits last 
year,” Associated Press, March 17, 2015, Retrevied  
fromhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/03/17/us-government-improper-
payments_n_6883650.html. 
Sabitier, P. (Ed.) Effective policy implementation. Lexington: Lexington Books 
Maruthappu M, Ologunde R, Gunarajasingam A. Is Health Care a Right? Health Reforms in the 





Marquis, M. S., & Long, S. H. (1996). Reconsidering the effect of Medicaid on health care 
services use. Health services research, 30(6), 791. 
Mazmanian, D. & Sabieter, P (Eds.). (1981). Effective policy implementation. Lexington, MA: 
Lexington Books. 
Mazmanian Daniel and Paul Sabieter. (1983). Implementation and public policy. Chicago: Scott  
        Foresman and Co. 
Moore School of Business (2002). Economic Impact of Medicaid on South Carolina. Colombia:  
University of South Carolina. 
Long, S. K., Stockley, K., & Dahlen, H. (2012). Massachusetts health reforms: Uninsurance 
remains low, self-reported health status improves as state prepares to tackle costs. Health 
Affairs, 10-1377. 
Levinson, D. R., & General, I. (2014). Access to Care: Provider Availability in Medicaid 
Managed Care. Washington, DC: Office of the Inspector General, Department of Health 
and Human Services. 
Lo Sasso, A. T., and Seamster, D. G. 2007. How federal and state policies affected hospital  
uncompensated care provision in the 1990s. Medical Care Research and Review, 64(6): 
731-744. 
Matland, R. E. (1995). Synthesizing the implementation literature: The ambiguity-conflict model 
of policy implementation. Journal of public administration research and theory, 5(2), 
145-174. 





McGinnis J. Michael, Williams-Russo P., Knickman, JR. (2002). The case for more active policy  
attention to health promotion. Health Affairs, 21(2): 78-93. 
Mead, Lawrence M. (2004). State political culture and welfare reform. Policy Studies Journa,l 
32(2): 271-296. 
Medicare. (2007). Compare home health agencies in your area.  Retrieved from the Medicare 
website: http://www.medicare.gov. 
Missouri Foundation for Health, Show Me Series: Report 5 Economic and Health Benefits of 
Missouri Medicaid. Spring 2005. 
National Federation of Independent Businesses (NFIB) et al. v. Kathleen Sebelius. 567 U.S. 
(2012). 
National Governors Association (NGA). (2011). 2011 Gubernatorial Election Information. 
Retrieved from the NGA website: 
http://www.nga.org/cms/home/governors/elections/col2-content/past-election-
information/2011- gubernatorial-election.html 
Nelson, A. R., Stith, A. Y., & Smedley, B. D. (Eds.). (2002). Unequal treatment: confronting 
racial and ethnic disparities in health care (full printed version). National Academies 
Press. 
Owcharenko, N. (2013). Why the Obamacare Medicaid Expansion Is Bad for Taxpayers and 
Patients. The Heritage Foundation. March, 5. 
Office of the Actuary (OACT), Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services. 2015a. National health expenditures by type 




Retrieved from: https://www.cms.gov/ Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-
Trendsand-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/Downloads/ NHE2014.zip. 
Phelps, E.  Charles (2016). Health Economics. Routledge: University of Rochester Press. 
Phillips, Kristine (2017, March 30).Bring it On!: Graham and Constituents Shout over Each 
other in Townhall Debacle. Washington Post. 
Pressman, Jeffery and Aaron Wildvasky. (1973). Implementation. Berkley: University of    
        California Press.   
Price, C. C., and C. Eibner. (2013). For states that opt out of Medicaid expansion: 3.6 million 
fewer insured and $8.4 billion less in federal payments. Health Affairs (Millwood), 
32(6):1030-1036. 
Rogers, E. (1995). Diffusion of innovations. (4th ed.). New York, NY: The Free Press. 
Schneider A, Elias R, Garfield R, Rousseau D, Wachino V. (2002). The Medicaid Resource 
Book. Washington, D.C.: Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured. 
Sheryl, G. S. & Michael P. (2010). Obama Signs Healthcare Overhaul bill with a   Flourish”, 
March 2010. Retrieved from the NY Times Website: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/24/health/policy/24health.html?mcubz=3. 
Sommers BD,  Buchmueller T, Decker SL, Carey C, Kronick R. (2013). The Affordable Care 
Act has led to significant gains in health insurance and access to care for young adults. 
Health Affairs (Millwood), 32(1):165–74. 
Sommers, B. D., & Gruber, J. (2017). Federal Funding Insulated State Budgets From Increased 
Spending Related To Medicaid Expansion. Health Affairs, 36(5), 938-944. 
Sommers B.D., Kenney G.M., Epstein A.M. New evidence on the Affordable Care Act: 




Starr, P. (2011). Remedy and reaction: The peculiar American struggle over health reform. Yale 
University Press: New Haven. 
Sparrow, M. (May 20, 2009). Criminal prosecution as a deterrent to health care fraud. Testimony 
before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs. 
Tanner, M., & Hughes, C. (2013). The Work versus Welfare Trade-Off: 2013-An Analysis of the 
Total Level of Welfare Benefits by State. 
Taylor, D. H. (2005). The case for Medicaid expansion in North Carolina. North Carolina 
medical journal, 78(1), 43-47. 
Thompson, F.J. (1981). Health policy and the bureaucracy: Politics and implementation. MIT 
Press: Cambridge. 
Tu, H. T., & Cohen, G. R. (2009). Financial and health burdens of chronic conditions grow. 
Center for Studying Health System Change Tracking Report, 24, 1-6. 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. (n.d.) Centers of Medicaid and Medicare Fiscal 
Year 2016. Retrieved from https://www.cms.gov/About-CMS/Agency-
Information/PerformanceBudget/Downloads/FY2016-CJ-Final.pdf 
U.S. Census Bureau. (2007). Retrieved from http://www.census.gov. 
U. S. Constitution. Amend. XIX. 
Van Horn, C.E. & Van Meter, D. (1976). “The Implementation of Intergovernmental Policy.” In 
Jones C. & Thomas R. (Eds.), Public Policy Making in a Federal System. London: Sage 
Publications 
Williams, W. (1980). The implementation perspective: A guide for managing social service  




Waits S.A., Reames B.N., Sheetz K.H., Englesbe M.J., & Campbell D.A. (2014). Anticipating 
the Effects of Medicaid Expansion on Surgical Care. JAMA Surg. 149(7):745–747. 
doi:10.1001/jamasurg.2014.222 
Watson, S. D. (1995). Medicaid physician participation: patients, poverty, and physician self-
interest. Am. JL & Med., 21, 191. 
Washington, H. A., Baker, R. B., Olakanmi, O., Savitt, T. L., Jacobs, E. A., Hoover, E., & 
Wynia, M. K. (2009). Segregation, civil rights, and health disparities: the legacy of 
African American physicians and organized medicine, 1910-1968. Journal of the 
National Medical Association, 101(6), 513-527. 
Weible, C. M., & Sabatier, P. A. (2007). A guide to the advocacy coalition 
framework. Handbook of public policy analysis: theory, politics, and methods, 123-136. 
Weil, Alan. (2013). Promoting cooperative federalism through state shared savings. Health         
            Affairs. 32(8). 














APPENDIX A: Variables Utilized from BRFSS 
 
Do you have any kind of health care coverage, including health 
insurance, prepaid plans such as HMOs, government plans such 
as Medicare, or Indian Health Service? (HLTHPLAN1) 
1 =Yes  
2 =No 
Was there a time during the last 12 months when you needed to 
see a doctor, but could not because of the cost? (MEDCOST) 
1 = Yes 
0 = No 
About how long has it been since you last had your blood 
cholesterol checked? (CHOLCHK) 
1= Within the past year 2 years 
2 =Longer than 2 years 




Was there a time in the past 12 months when you needed to see 
a doctor but could not because of cost? (FLUSHOT) 
1=Yes 
2=No 
About how long has it been since you last visited a doctor for a 
routine checkup? (CHECKUP) 
1 = Within the past 2 years  
0 = Longer than 2 years 
 
